On the comparative advantage of U.S. manufacturing: evidence from the shale gas revolution by Arezki, Rabah et al.
  
Rabah Arezki, Thiemo Fetzer and Frank Pisch 
On the comparative advantage of U.S. 
manufacturing: evidence from the shale gas 
revolution 
 
Article (Accepted version) 
(Refereed) 
 Original citation: 
Arezki, Rabah, Fetzer, Thiemo and Pisch, Frank (2017) On the comparative advantage of U.S. 
manufacturing: evidence from the shale gas revolution. Journal of International Economics . 
ISSN 0022-1996 
 
DOI: 10.1016/j.jinteco.2017.03.002   
 
Reuse of this item is permitted through licensing under the Creative Commons: 
 
© 2017 Elsevier B.V.  
CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 
 
This version available at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/72022/ 
 
Available in LSE Research Online: April 2017 
 
LSE has developed LSE Research Online so that users may access research output of the 
School. Copyright © and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the individual 
authors and/or other copyright owners. You may freely distribute the URL 
(http://eprints.lse.ac.uk) of the LSE Research Online website.  
 
 
 
  	

On the Comparative Advantage of U.S. Manufacturing: Evidence from the
Shale Gas Revolution
Rabah Arezki, Thiemo Fetzer, Frank Pisch
PII: S0022-1996(17)30028-4
DOI: doi: 10.1016/j.jinteco.2017.03.002
Reference: INEC 3030
To appear in: Journal of International Economics
Received date: 9 July 2015
Revised date: 22 February 2017
Accepted date: 5 March 2017
Please cite this article as: Arezki, Rabah, Fetzer, Thiemo, Pisch, Frank, On the Com-
parative Advantage of U.S. Manufacturing: Evidence from the Shale Gas Revolution,
Journal of International Economics (2017), doi: 10.1016/j.jinteco.2017.03.002
This is a PDF ﬁle of an unedited manuscript that has been accepted for publication.
As a service to our customers we are providing this early version of the manuscript.
The manuscript will undergo copyediting, typesetting, and review of the resulting proof
before it is published in its ﬁnal form. Please note that during the production process
errors may be discovered which could aﬀect the content, and all legal disclaimers that
apply to the journal pertain.
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
On the Comparative Advantage of U.S.
Manufacturing: Evidence from the Shale Gas
Revolution
Rabah Arezki, Thiemo Fetzer, and Frank Pisch ∗
February 2017
Abstract
This paper provides novel empirical evidence of the effects of a plausibly
exogenous change in relative factor prices on United States manufacturing
production and trade. The shale gas revolution has led to (very) large and
persistent differences in the price of natural gas between the United States
and the rest of the world reflecting differences in endowment of difficult-
to-trade natural gas. Guided by economic theory, empirical tests on output,
factor reallocation and international trade are conducted. Results show that
U.S. manufacturing exports have grown by about 10 percent on account of
their energy intensity since the onset of the shale revolution. We also doc-
ument that the U.S. shale revolution is operating both at the intensive and
extensive margins.
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Our 100-year supply of natural gas is a big factor in drawing jobs back
to our shores. Many are in manufacturing – the quintessential middle-
class job. During the last decade, it was widely accepted that American
manufacturing was in irreversible decline. [...] And today, American
manufacturing has added more than 700,000 new jobs. It’s growing
almost twice as fast as the rest of the economy. 1
- President Barack Obama
We came to the conclusion this – the shale revolution – will be a sus-
tainable advantage for the United States. That is why we are comfort-
able making an investment.2
- Hans-Ulrich Engel, BASF North America Chief
1 Introduction
The United States is in the midst of an energy revolution. It all started in the
1980s with an independent company founded by the late George Mitchell. His
company had been experimenting with the application of different hydraulic frac-
turing techniques – a well stimulation technique in which rock is fractured by a
hydraulically pressurized liquid – eventually finding the right approach to eco-
nomically extract the natural gas in the Barnet shale formation in Texas. Later on,
the combination of hydraulic fracturing and directional, i.e. non-vertical, drilling
was widely adopted by the gas industry, in turn spawning a natural gas boom
in North America in the 2000s. The surge in the production of shale gas has
made the United States the largest natural gas producer in the world. Anecdotal
evidence from news reports indicates that the dynamics in manufacturing capac-
ity expansions have accelerated as a result of U.S. shale employment, with non
U.S.-based chemical producers having recently announced USD 72 billion worth
of investment in new plants.3 As exemplified by the quotes above, the shale gas
1Excerpt from remarks at Northwestern University on October 2, 2014. See
http://www.whitehouse.gov.
2Excerpt from an interview with Bloomberg News on June 27, 2014,
http://www.bloomberg.com
3See http://www.bloomberg.com.
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revolution has sparked a policy debate on the potential implications of this revo-
lution on the U.S. economy.
The present paper addresses a basic economic question, namely what are the
effects of a change in the price of a production input (natural gas), in one country
relative to other countries, on the pattern of production and trade. The shale gas
revolution provides a quasi-natural experiment to explore such a question. The
identifying assumption throughout this paper is, indeed, that the international
difference in natural gas prices resulting from a shock to natural gas endowment
in the U.S. is unanticipated and therefore exogenous.
Natural gas has the lowest energy density, measured by the amount of energy
stored in a given unit of matter, among all fossil fuels (petroleum products, natu-
ral gas, and coal). Even with pipelines, long distance trade of natural gas from the
point of extraction becomes uneconomical quite quickly, as the gas in the pipeline
needs to be cooled and pressurized, which uses up significant amounts of energy.
Liquefaction at origin and re-gasification at destination are the only other means
for long distance trade. However, the laws of physics governing liquefaction and
re-gasification imply an exogenously given lower bound on transport costs, which
is substantial: the energy loss from the liquefaction process alone is estimated to
range between 11-30 percent. Add to that the costs of transportation, storage and
operating.4
Natural gas markets are much less integrated compared to markets for other
fossil fuels.5 It is not surprising, therefore, that following the shale gas boom in
the U.S. natural gas prices have fallen sharply and are effectively decoupled from
those in the rest of the world. Figure 1 presents the tight relationship between
the estimated U.S. natural gas reserves, a measure of the natural gas endowment,
and the absolute price gap between the US and an OECD Europe average. The
estimated technologically recoverable natural gas reserves have more than dou-
bled since 1997 due a combination of horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing,
rendering shale deposits accessible. We use this unanticipated exogenous shock
to provide us with the necessary identifying variation for our empirical analysis.
4Appendix A.1 provides more details on the physics of natural gas transportation and the
implied transportation costs.
5In Appendix Figure A2 we document that there is very limited trade in natural gas. The only
significant direct natural gas export is trade between the US and Mexico and Canada; our results
are robust to removing these countries from the analysis.
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Figure 1: Evolution of estimated Natural gas reserves and absolute US-OECD
Natural Gas Price Gap
Notes: On the left axis the figure presents EIA estimates of natural gas reserves, the right axis
presents the industrial use natural gas price gap between the U.S. and OECD Europe.
As indicated in Figure 1, the expansion of the recoverable natural gas reserves
closely tracks the evolution of the natural gas price difference between the US and
the OECD average. For instance, in August 2014 U.S. natural gas sold at 4 dollars
per million British thermal units, compared to 10 dollars in Europe and close to
17 dollars in Asia. Figure 1 also illustrates that the price differences arising from
the shale gas production boom can econometrically serve as a measure of the U.S.
endowment shock.
To help guide our empirical investigation and facilitate a discussion of the
mechanisms at play in our reduced form empirical analyses, we rely on a theoret-
ical framework that provides several testable predictions for the effects of a change
natural gas prices on output, factor re-allocation, and trade. We derive our main
predictions from a state-of-the-art two country, two factors, two industries model
with heterogeneous firms as in Bernard et al. (2007). This modelling choice is
motivated by a large literature in international trade that highlights the important
4
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role heterogeneous firms play for aggregate exports and imports.6 Indeed, shocks
that increase competition in an industry lead to exit of the least productive firms
and hence boost aggregate productivity in that sector.7 This is an important chan-
nel in our context, since the famous Heckscher-Ohlin results may cease to hold
in such a world: If the industry that uses energy relatively less intensively is left
much more competitive after a positive energy endowment shock, selection may
make it sufficiently more productive to actually attract resources and increase its
output relative to the energy intensive sector. Similarly, exporters in the less en-
ergy intensive industry might become more productive or more numerous, thus
overturning the standard international trade implications found in neo-classical
models. We prove, however, that selection forces in our model actually reinforce
the standard reallocation mechanisms and therefore the main predictions of our
model amount to standard “Heckscher-Ohlin specialization according to compar-
ative advantage” in that an increase in the price gap between the U.S. and other
countries will increase (decrease) output, factor usage, and the volume of US ex-
ports (imports) differentially more in relatively more energy intensive industries.
Even crude motivational summary statistics reveal evidence in support of
these theoretical predictions. Figure 2 presents a measure of the energy inten-
sity of overall U.S. manufacturing sector output, exploring energy intensity coef-
ficients drawn up from time-varying input-out (IO) tables. The dynamic of the
absorption of energy in output co-moves tightly with the natural gas price gap
between the U.S. and OECD Europe. In the empirical exercise, we show that there
is robust evidence that the U.S. economy behaves much in the way theoretically
predicted. Manufacturing sector output of energy intensive industries expands
relative to less energy intensive sectors in response to the endowment shock. Fur-
ther, we present evidence suggesting that other factors of production, labor and
capital, have also differentially moved towards those manufacturing sectors that
are energy intensive.
The theoretical predictions moreover suggest that in response to the endow-
ment shock U.S. manufacturing exports should absorb more of the now abundant
factor. Again, there is evidence suggesting that this is taking place in the raw data.
Figure 3 suggests that the rise in U.S. manufacturing exports weighted by their
6For a recent overview of this literature see Melitz and Redding (2014).
7See Melitz (2003).
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Figure 2: Evolution of the energy content of US Exports and absolute US-OECD
Natural Gas Price Gap
Notes: On the left axis the figure presents a time varying measure of the energy intensity of U.S.
manufacturing output, using IO tables produced by the BEA for the years 1997-2012. The right
axis presents the industrial use natural gas price gap between the U.S. and OECD Europe.
2002 energy intensity moves in line with the rise in the price gap (our proxy for
the endowment shock) between the U.S. and the rest of the world. In the empiri-
cal exercise, we show that this finding is robust to highly demanding fixed effects
specifications, which allow us to absorb many of the classical omitted variables,
such as time-varying trade costs, that make it difficult to estimate and causally in-
terpret estimated coefficients in gravity equations. The results suggest that energy
intensive manufacturing sectors significantly benefit – in terms of input costs and,
hence, output shares – from reduced natural gas prices due to the shale gas shock.
A back of the envelope calculation suggests that energy intensive manufacturing
sector exports increased by USD 101 billion for 2012 due to the shale gas boom.
This paper and its findings contribute to several strands of the literature. First,
we add to a substantial body of work devoted to testing the central prediction
of what is known as the Heckscher-Ohlin-Vanek (HOV) framework, namely that
6
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Figure 3: Evolution of the energy content of US Exports and absolute US-OECD
Natural Gas Price Gap
Notes: On the left axis the figure presents U.S. manufacturing exports weighted by their total
energy intensity according to energy cost shares derived from the 2002 U.S. IO table. The right
axis presents the industrial use natural gas price gap between the U.S. and OECD Europe.
countries net export the factors they are relatively abundantly endowed with.8
This literature uses data for a range of countries and relates a country’s factor con-
tent of net trade to that country’s relative endowment structure. It generally finds
that (under the assumption of different technologies in different countries) there
is reasonable empirical support for the HOV prediction. Our work proposes an
alternative test using quasi-experimental variation in the data for a single country
– to our best knowledge this has not been done before. We show that the HOV
prediction is accurate: holding energy contents constant at pre-levels, we show
that energy intensive trade differentially grows due to an increase in the U.S.
endowment with natural gas. Moreover, using the same empirical strategy, we
8For very good reviews of this research see Baldwin (2008) and Feenstra (2015). Seminal con-
tributions include Leontief (1953), Leamer (1984), Bowen et al. (1987), Trefler (1995), Davis and
Weinstein (2001), Schott (2003), Schott (2004), and Choi and Krishna (2004). More recently, De-
baere (2014) has shown that water abundant countries export water intensive goods, using a cross
country regression approach.
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also provide evidence that the neo-classical predictions regarding specialization
according to endowment driven comparative advantage on the domestic produc-
tion side (known as the Rybczynski Theorem9) appear to obtain in the data; both
output and production factors are reallocated towards energy intensive industries
as a consequence of the shale gas boom.
The second strand of literature explores the economic consequences of lower
energy prices, and specifically natural gas prices, following the shale gas revo-
lution. Most of the existing work has focused on the first order local economic
effects of the shale gas boom. These papers study the direct effects of resource
extraction activity on incomes, the distribution of income, and the local economic
structure.10 Some of the available estimates indicate that the fracking boom in the
U.S. may have created between 400,000 and 800,000 new jobs over the last 10 years
(see Feyrer et al., 2015; Fetzer, 2014). This paper contributes by exploring the in-
direct effects of the shale gas boom, not at the point of extraction, but rather how
it propagates via lower energy cost, stimulating economic activity in the energy
intensive manufacturing sectors. It also relates to Hausman and Kellogg (2015)
who estimate the welfare gains from lower natural gas prices to natural gas con-
sumers and producers.11 Our paper contributes to this literature by widening the
scope of analysis of the effect of the shale gas boom to international trade.
Lastly, by focusing on the U.S. manufacturing sector, this paper also relates to
a strand of literature investigating the evolution of U.S. manufacturing. Impor-
tant contributions in this literature have explored the employment implications
of U.S. trade liberalization, mainly vis-a`-vis China. Implicitly, that amounts to
testing the importance of China’s comparative advantage in terms of lower la-
bor costs. Pierce and Schott (2012b) find evidence for the link between the sharp
9Other work that tests the Rybczynski Theorem includes Harrigan (1995), Harrigan (1997), and
Bernstein and Weinstein (2002).
10See for example Allcott and Keniston (2013), Fetzer (2014) and Feyrer et al. (2015) in the
context of the US and Arago´n and Rud (2013), Sachs and Warner (1995), van Wijnbergen (1984) in
context of developing countries.
11Two recent studies have exploited sector level data to isolate the effect of lower energy prices
on the manufacturing sector but not on trade. Using industry-level data, Melick (2014) estimates
that the fall in the price of natural gas since 2006 is associated with a 2.3 percent increase in
activity for the entire manufacturing sector, with much larger effects of 30 percent or more for the
most energy-intensive industries. Celasun et al. (2014) find that a doubling of the natural gas price
differential in favor of the home country would increase manufacturing industrial production by
1.5 percent.
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drop in U.S. manufacturing employment and a change in U.S. trade policy that
eliminated potential tariff increases on Chinese imports. Harrison and McMillan
(2006), using firm-level data, find that off-shoring by U.S. based multinationals is
associated with a (quantitatively small) decline in manufacturing employment.12
Our contribution to this literature is to document systematic evidence of a notice-
able relative expansion of energy intensive manufacturing sector employment in
the U.S., which we attribute to significantly lower natural gas prices. We argue
that the difference in natural gas prices between the U.S. and the rest of the world
is not transitory, but rather persistent in nature due to the physical properties of
natural gas and the distance to foreign markets. The sizable gap in natural gas
prices between the U.S. and the rest of the world might to some degree help limit
U.S. comparative ”dis-advantage” in terms of labor costs.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the
theoretical framework, while Section 3 presents the comparative static exercise
that we bring to the data. Section 4 describes the various datasets used, while
Section 5 lays out the empirical strategy. Section 6 presents the main results and
robustness checks. Section 7 concludes.
2 Conceptual Framework
In this section we outline a theoretical framework that will guide and inform
our empirical exercises. As mentioned above, we derive our main predictions
from a two country, two factors, two industries model with heterogeneous firms
as in Bernard et al. (2007). Since the theoretical model itself is not part of our
contribution and has been analyzed in detail before in Bernard et al. (2007), we
will keep the exposition brief and spend more time on the four key predictions
we derive for a change in the endowment of natural gas.13
12Autor et al. (2013) analyze the effect of rising Chinese import competition between 1990 and
2007 on US local labor markets. The authors find that rising imports cause higher unemployment,
lower labor force participation, and reduced wages in local labor markets that house import-
competing manufacturing industries. Import competition explains one-quarter of the contempo-
raneous aggregate decline in US manufacturing employment.
13In contrast to this paper, Bernard et al. (2007) only discuss the effects of a trade liberalisation.
Huang et al. (2015) analyze the effect of an increase of capital on Chinese trade patterns in a quan-
tified model similar to ours. Since our contribution is identification through quasi-experimental
variation, we view their work as complementary.
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2.1 Set-up and Industry Technology
There are two countries, indexed by k, l14 and they are both endowed with energy
in the form of natural gas, N¯k, and with an aggregate factor L¯k that comprises all
other inputs. We do not have to take a stance on the pattern of relative abundance,
since this will be the object of our comparative static exercise. Both factors are
perfectly mobile across industries, but cannot cross country borders – factor prices
wkN are equalized across industries.
There are two industries15, indexed by i, j ∈ {1, 2}, whose technologies are
available everywhere and whose respective goods are produced by combining the
two inputs in a Cobb-Douglas fashion (with energy intensity βi). Finally, there is
a heterogeneous Hicks neutral output shifter denoted by ϕ, which is specific to
every firm in those industries. Marginal costs are therefore
MCki (ϕ) =
(wkN)
βi(wkL)
1−βi
ϕ
.
The goods manufactured by the two industries can be produced in an infi-
nite multitude of horizontally differentiated varieties and there is monopolistic
competition among active firms in their respective markets. We assume that in-
ternational trade of merchandise is possible, but costly in the sense that when a
quantity x is shipped, only x/τi units arrive at the destination. Trade costs are
allowed to differ across goods, but not across varieties within the same industry.
2.2 Consumers
The representative consumers in the two countries have CES preferences over
all available varieties of either good and spend a share αi on each industry i
′s
output, where αi + αj = 1. They are willing to substitute different varieties for
each other, but imperfectly so with a constant elasticity of substitution σ > 1.
14Our exposition will be limited to expressions for country k whenever sufficient.
15While obviously stylized, the 2× 2× 2 structure we use for our conceptual framework is rich
enough to provide us with a sizable set of predictions, so that we refrain from discussing the
complications of larger product and factor spaces and the intricacies of existence and uniqueness
of equilibria in these settings. Huang et al. (2015) extend the model in Bernard et al. (2007) to
a continuum of goods and show that the predictions for an endowment shock are essentially
equivalent to the ones we find.
10
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These assumptions give rise to standard CES demand functions and ideal price
indices Pki .
2.3 Firms
Firms operate under increasing returns to scale according to the cost function
Cki (ϕ) =
(
fid +
qi
ϕ
)
(wkN)
βi(wkL)
1−βi ,
where fixed costs fid are industry specific. All costs in our model are paid for
in units of the same Cobb-Douglas factor bundle (wkN)
βi(wkL)
1−βi . Furthermore,
anticipating the equilibrium outcome, increasing returns to scale ensure that any
variety is produced only by a single firm.
There is free entry and a perfectly competitive mass of potential entrants can
pay a sunk cost fei(w
k
N)
βi(wkL)
1−βi 16 to draw their productivity parameter ϕ from
a Pareto distribution with shape parameter γ and lower bound 1. As every firm
ends up producing a specific variety, we will index varieties by ϕ. We furthermore
assume that there are fixed costs of exporting fix(w
k
N)
βi(wkL)
1−βi , with fix > fid,
which reflects the need for maintenance of a distribution network or marketing
expenditure abroad. The ordering of fixed costs furthermore generates the well
documented empirical pattern that only the most productive firms export (see
Bernard and Jensen”, 1995; Bernard and Jensen, 1999).
2.4 General Equilibrium and Factor Price Equalization
For reasons of expositional clarity we defer the solution of the model and a state-
ment of the equilibrium conditions to appendices C.1 and C.1.2.
The key explanatory variable in our empirical exercises is the difference in
natural gas prices between the US and Europe, so that our theoretical model
must allow for factor prices to differ across countries. The first assumption that
breaks the factor price equalization theorem that applies in standard neo-classical
models is the one of strictly positive trade costs, which entails that the law of one
16With this specification of the entry technology we follow Caliendo et al. (2015) just like Bernard
et al. (2007) do. This is not without loss of generality, but allows for a much simpler solution of
the model.
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price fails. Secondly, firm heterogeneity and endogenous selection can give rise
to Ricardian productivity differences across countries at the industry level and
therefore to different (industry weighted) marginal products of both factors.
The next section presents the theoretical predictions regarding an exogenous
endowment shock to U.S. natural gas.
3 The Natural Gas Boom: Predictions
We model the shale gas boom in the U.S. as an increase in country k’s energy
endowment. Figure 1 indicated a tight relationship between a measure of the
U.S. natural gas endowment and the price gap of natural gas in the U.S. and
OECD Europe. Since it is very difficult to measure endowments, especially across
countries, we resort to relative prices as our preferred variable, for which data are
more readily available.17
Our comparative static exercise is as follows. We explicitly outline the impli-
cations of an exogenously driven fall in the relative price of energy in country k
that increases the price gap with country l in equilibrium – in other words, we
compare equilibria with different factor prices just as in the empirical section be-
low. Implicitly, we think of this effect as caused by an increase in k’s endowment
with energy. We choose this formulation to present our predictions in a way that
is consistent with our data.
In order illustrate our results, we have quantified the model as shown in Ap-
pendix C.3. In these quantitative exercises we linearly increase the U.S. endow-
ment with natural gas, which will be analogous to the empirical results over time,
since shale gas extraction capacity has gradually increased over several years.
The key object in our analysis is k’s industry level marginal cost relative to the
marginal cost in the same industry in l,
17It may be argued that the shale gas boom is better conceived of as a technological innovation
that made the extraction industry more productive. The implications of the two alternatives,
technology or endowments, are virtually the same if we model technological advances in natural
gas extraction as an increase in efficiency units. Alternatively, if the extraction industry itself
is small compared to the rest of the economy, the general equilibrium effects of a technological
advancement on wages, capital rents, and other factors of production will be second order and
the results obtained by our modelling choice will be very similar. Finally, international trade in
natural gas is prohibitively expensive and therefore our approach may be viewed as more natural.
12
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wˆi ≡
(
wkN
wlN
)βi (
wkL
wlL
)1−βi
, i ∈ {1, 2}.
As we show in our derivations, all endogenous expressions of interest can be writ-
ten in terms of this ratio. In fact, this is intuitive: in a supply side economy like
ours with a relatively mechanical ‘inactive’ demand side, all shocks are captured
by relative factor prices and, hence, marginal costs.
Ahead of our main results below, it will prove useful to first examine the
behavior of aggregate industry productivity. We show in appendix C.2 that there
is a one-to-one relationship between relative factor prices and relative aggregate
productivity at the industry level. What is more, we demonstrate that aggregate
productivities move in tandem with relative marginal costs in the sense that the
effects of shocks that change relative factor prices will be amplified by the aggregate
productivity response, not dampened.
The corollary of this result is that our economy in fact behaves in a very sim-
ilar way to a standard neo-classical one, except that all variables will be more
responsive to shocks that change relative factor prices in equilibrium. Even more
importantly, we can expect that Rybczynski and Heckscher-Ohlin style predic-
tions can be derived.
3.1 The Domestic Economy: Factor Intensity and Output Effects
In this subsection we use our theoretical framework to outline predictions with
respect to the domestic economy. For ease of exposition, we start with the predic-
tions for gross output. We can show that the value of gross output at the industry
level,
Rki = αiR
k
1− li
Rl
Rk
1− ciwˆ
−σγ
σ−1
i
, (1)
where Rk are total revenues,
li ≡ ci
wˆ
σγ
σ−1
i − ci
1− ciwˆ
σγ
σ−1
i
,
13
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
and ci ≡ τ
−γ
i ( fix/ fid)
−γ+σ−1
σ−1 .
Using the fact that in the case of a fall in relative energy prices wˆi will experi-
ence a greater fall if an industry is more energy intensive, we can derive our first
prediction:
Prediction 1 (Quasi-Rybczynski) An increase in the price gap between the U.S. and
OECD Europe will increase output differentially more in relatively more energy intensive
industries.18
The intuition is as follows. First, we condition on industry productivity, i.e.
we hold the set of active firms fixed, which leaves us with a standard neoclas-
sical model at the industry level, in which the Rybczynski theorem applies and
well known mechanisms operate: The shale gas boom lowers the relative price of
energy and the industry that uses energy more intensively will attract the lion’s
share of the natural gas that has become available. As it requires more of the com-
posite input as well, wkL is bid up, so that the other industry is willing to release
it. In equilibrium, there will be reallocation of resources towards the sector that
uses the now more abundant factor more intensively.
As argued above, it turns out that the intra-industry selection effects will am-
plify this movement and hence act as a second driving force behind prediction
1. In particular, lower marginal costs in the energy intensive industry will ce-
teris paribus raise ex ante expected profits (for all entrants), so that they become
strictly positive net of sunk entry costs. More firms will be encouraged to enter
and the industry becomes more competitive, which results in a higher zero profit
cut-off productivity. The latter is a sufficient statistic for average productivity in
the industry due to our Pareto assumption and therefore reallocation of output
towards more productive firms entails higher efficiency in the energy intensive
sector. The same mechanism operates in the composite input intensive industry,
but here the change in marginal costs is smaller – in fact, marginal costs rise – so
that relative productivity in the energy intensive sector is enhanced. Clearly, firm
heterogeneity drives all variables in the same direction as the neoclassical forces
do, but reinforces this movement.
18In our 2× 2× 2 framework, we can prove the stronger result that output of the composite fac-
tor intensive industry contracts, while the energy intensive one expands. Since our identification
strategy will not, however, be able to isolate level effects we resort to the weaker statement.
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To get a rough idea of the quantitative predictions of our model we calibrate
the parameters of the model and, using the base year 2006, simulate how an
increase in the gas price gap of USD 1 affects output in the energy intensive
sector relative to output in the composite intensive one, holding total output and
all other prices fixed – a more detailed explanation can be found in Appendix
C.3. The energy intensive sector is predicted to expand by 3.9 percentage points
relative to the composite intensive one.
Our second prediction is tightly linked to the first one:
Prediction 2 (Factor Reallocation) An increase in the price gap between the US and
OECD Europe will reallocate resources more strongly towards more energy intensive in-
dustries.
Formally, with our simple Cobb-Douglas production structure at the industry
level, aggregate factor allocations satisfy the expressions
Nki = βi
Rki
wkN
Lki = (1− βi)
Rki
wkL
(2)
where Nki and L
k
i denote energy and labour allocations to industry i in country
k. Invoking the result in prediction 1, it is clear that after the shock, energy is
reallocated to the energy intensive sector. In order for it to fully employ this ad-
ditional factor supply, it needs to attract more of the composite input and we can
be assured that the negative price effect of rising composite input prices will be
overcompensated by the urge to increase output. The composite input intensive
sector will see a loss of resources.
3.2 The Open Economy: International Trade
We are also able to derive a simple expression for exports as function of the
relative price gap of energy:
Xki = M
k
i r¯
k
ix =
ki
1 + ki
Rki , (3)
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where
ki ≡ ci
wˆ
−σγ
σ−1
i − ci
1− ciwˆ
−σγ
σ−1
i
,
r¯kix are average export sales across firms in industry i and country k, and M
k
i is
the number of these exporters. Again using prediction 1, regarding international
trade we predict:
Prediction 3 (Quasi-Heckscher-Ohlin) An increase in the price gap between the U.S.
and OECD Europe will increase (decrease) the volume of US exports (imports) differen-
tially more in relatively more energy intensive industries.
To gain intuition for this result, it is useful to examine the decomposition into
the number of firms that export and their average export volume. All else equal, a
relative drop in energy prices lowers the fixed costs of exporting, the zero export
profit cut-off ϕkix falls, and a measure of previously purely domestically selling,
inefficient firms are now able to enter the foreign market. As a result, average
exports at the firm level actually shrink. However, at the same time, the extensive
margin of exporters adjusts: a larger share of firms exports and the measure of
successful entrants in the industry expands. Taken together, as is evident from
expression (3), total export volumes at the industry level grow, and differentially
more so in the energy intensive industry.
Repeating the quantitative exercise described above and in Appendix C.3 for
exports, we predict that, starting in 2006, a widening of the gas price gap would
ceteris paribus lead to a relative increase of exports of the energy intensive sector
by roughly 5.2 percentage points.
In country l, the energy intensive sector faces more competition when export-
ing to k after the shock, which leads to both a lower number of exporters and
lower average revenues abroad. Since we have only two countries, the prediction
regarding imports follows.19
The simple two country framework we use is highly tractable and allows for
interesting analytical results. Unfortunately, however, it lacks the ability to pro-
19We would like to point out that in our model we assume that the same technology is used in
both countries, which is a strong assumption and we will come back to this issue in the empirical
analyses on imports below.
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vide predictions for one important margin, the extensive industry margin. This
margin is significant in that it provides a means of diversification of demand
shocks, potentially allows for stronger and more varied technology spill-overs,
and may strengthen diplomatic bonds, among other advantages. We are there-
fore interested in how the shale gas boom in the U.S. affected the number of
industries that trade with a given country.
Instead of extending our model, we briefly describe an extension of the two
country version and derive the main prediction from it. An elegant way of tack-
ling the problem of zeros in the trade matrix is provided by assuming that id-
iosyncratic firm productivity follow a truncated Pareto distribution as described
and analysed in Helpman et al. (2008). The distribution of productivity within
industries is now capped from above, so that no firm will draw a productivity
higher than some threshold ϕ¯. In this case, if
rkix(ϕ¯) < fix(w
k
N)
βi(wkN)
1−βi
there will be no exports from country k to country l in industry i. A sufficient drop
in the energy price reverses the inequality and spurs exporting, the likelihood of
which is increasing in the energy intensity of the industry, ceteris paribus. Our
final prediction is therefore
Prediction 4 (The Extensive Industry Margin) An increase in the price gap between
the U.S. and OECD Europe will increase the extensive industry margin of U.S. exports
differentially more in relatively more energy intensive industries.
The stylized model presented here provides us with a good understanding
of the mechanisms at work when endowments change and how we can relate
allocations to prices in equilibrium. To what extent do these predictions derived
from a 2x2x2 model generalize to a real world, empirical setting?
Regarding the country dimension, it is straightforward to constrain empiri-
cal work by introducing country fixed effects or by aggregating across countries,
treating all countries outside the home country as a single entity. We will adopt
the former approach later on.
The theoretical Heckscher-Ohlin literature highlights that indeterminacy is-
sues can arise in worlds of multiple factors and multiple goods, which potentially
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lead to modifications or even failures of our predictions (Feenstra (2015)). Cru-
cially, the results of our empirical work below, even if consistent with our main
derivations for the 2x2x2 model, would not constitute a proper test of neoclassical
trade theory (or at least of one of the most prominent set of mechanisms).
There are three answers to this challenge. First, as Feenstra (2015) argues,
there is (weak) empirical evidence (Kohli, 1993 that the sufficient conditions on
the numbers of goods and factors are met (more factors than goods), so that
indeterminacy is not a first order concern. Secondly, in the least ambitious inter-
pretation of our theoretical model we would argue that our state-of-the-art theory
merely guides our empirical efforts and that we do not provide a strict test of
the model. Finally, apart from the aforementioned restriction on the cardinality
of good and factor sets, there is no reason to suspect any problems in a more
general version of our model. The underlying complementarity between factor
abundance and factor intensity is unimpaired (cf. Costinot and Rodrı´guez-clare,
2014) and, upon inspection, the system of equations shown in Appendix C.1.2
does not suggest any further complications. Moreover, as Huang et al. (2015)
show, it is possible to derive very similar predictions in a Bernard et al. (2007)
type model with a continuum of goods.
We now turn to presenting the data set used for the main empirical analysis.
4 Data
In order to test the main theoretical predictions, we proceed in two steps. First,
we present evidence on factor allocation and output effects in the manufacturing
sector, and secondly, we present results pertaining to the trade responses. We
combine several data sources for this purpose, some details of which are provided
here.20
4.1 Factor Allocation and Output Effects
In order to measure output and sector allocation effects, we work with sector
level GDP data produced by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). These data
20A more detailed discussion of the individual data sets and sources used is relegated to Ap-
pendix A.
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come at an annual resolution for the period 2000-2013, covering the whole of the
U.S. across 150 five digit industries, classified according to the North American
Industry Classification System (NAICS). We match these data with the five digit
sector energy intensities as measured through the 2002 IO tables.
We furthermore want to explore the impact of the shale gas boom on the allo-
cation of two factors of production, capital and labor. We draw on detailed county
level employment data from the County Business Patterns (CBP). We use the five
digit NAICS sector disaggregation to produce an annual balanced panel from
2000 to 2013 and match this to energy intensities constructed at the across 171
five digit NAICS sectors from the 2002 IO tables. The data provide employment
during the first week of March in a given year.
As we noted, the focus of this paper is not to explore the distinct local eco-
nomic effects of the shale gas boom. Rather, we explore the extent to which we
see wider spillover effects of the endowment shock, that work through the theo-
retical mechanisms discussed. Our identifying variation does not exploit spatial
variation in natural gas price differences within the U.S. as these are second order;
further, since the trade data used are not geographic, in order to be internally con-
sistent, we remove the spatial dimension of the domestic data. To ensure that our
results are not capturing the direct economic spillovers due to local extraction, we
remove counties from the aggregation sample that are located in the proximity of
shale deposits.21 The main dependent variable will be the log of employment by
sector and year.
The third data source we use will allow us to shed light on capital expenditure
as a proxy to capture capital allocation. The data we use are proprietary data on
manufacturing plant expansion and new plant investments collected by Conway.
The data have the most extensive U.S. coverage capturing capital expenditures.22
For an investment project to be included in the data set, it needs to meet at least
one of the following criteria: (1) the project cost should be at least USD 1 million,
(2) covering at least 20,000 sq. ft. or (3) create employment for at least 50 people.
21We use the common Energy Information Administration Map of Shale Plays and remove any
county, that has a non-empty overlap with any shale play. This removes 24% of all counties across
the U.S., a map of the major shale plays is presented in Appendix Figure A4
22Some subsets of the data have been used in previous research studying the impact of capital
expenditures in the manufacturing sector on local economic structure (see Greenstone et al. (2010),
Greenstone and Moretti (2003)).
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In total, the data contain information on 26,510 capital expenditures, totalling ap-
proximately USD 717 billion in capacity additions. The majority (3 quarters) of
the capacity additions are coded at the five digit NAICS resolution; the remaining
projects are mapped to the most representative five digit NAICS code. The data
are available over the time period from 2003- 2013. We do not observe each event
specific to a project ranging from announcement to completion. This introduces
noise in our dependent variable. To be consistent throughout, we use as time
variable the year in which a project was entered into the Conway database, which
for the vast majority coincides with the date that the investment was announced.
As with the employment data, we remove the explicit spatial component of the
data by aggregating overall capital expenditures occurring within a five digit sec-
tor within the U.S., after having removed counties that lie above any known shale
deposits that may be affected directly by the extraction activities taking place. The
result is an annual level national panel at the five digit sector resolution.23
4.2 International Trade
The trade data are from Schott (2004). We use concordances provided by Peter
Schott and the BEA to match IO tables data to the foreign trade harmonized codes.
The resulting dataset used in our main analysis of U.S. imports and exports is a
balanced panel at the five digit sector.
We map the trade data to 158 manufacturing sector codes at the five digit level
from the 2002 IO tables. There are 218 destination countries or territories and 16
years of data from 1997-2012.24 Not all observations have positive trade, in which
23We have replicated our analyses with information on capital provided by the NBER and the
CES. The unconditional correlation between our Conway data and the relevant NBER-CES variable
capturing industry investment at the 5 digit NAICS level is 0.59. Qualitatively the results are
similar, although the point estimates using the NBER-CES data are larger compared to the ones
obtained from our Conway data. However, the latter are estimated with more precision. This
is not too surprising as the Conway data captures announcements and not necessarily the exact
point that investment expenditures are incurred. We have a preference for the Conway data
as they allow us to remove investment happening in counties above or near shale deposits and
this information is likely to reflect completely new additions to capacity, whereas the NBER-CES
investment data may capture capital replacement. The results are available from the authors upon
request.
24We drop 1996 as the NAICS classification was first introduced with the 1997 census. The raw
data contain 240 distinct destinations. We further remove 22 countries or territories which either
did not continuously exist over the sample period (for example Serbia, Montenegro and Serbia
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case a zero is reported. That allows us to study the extensive margin of trade as
well, i.e. trade occurring for new good and country pairs.25
4.3 Energy Intensity
To construct energy intensity, we use the 2002 BEA IO tables – i.e. the ones that
prevail before the shale boom – at the five digit NAICS industry classification
level. Later IO tables could also be used, in particular the 2007 version. How-
ever, this is problematic given the fact that technology coefficients derived from
later IO tables are endogenous and would thus potentially bias our regression
estimates (see e.g. Morrow and Trefler, 2014 for a discussion; we have shown
evidence for this in Figure 2).26 In total, the IO tables differentiate between 171
five digit manufacturing sectors. There is meaningful variation in the measured
energy intensities across these sectors. We distinguish between energy consumed
from all sources (in particular electricity and natural gas) and natural gas exclu-
sively, as an alternative. We point out that the latter is difficult to measure, since
the Oil and Gas extraction sector in the IO table is not further disaggregated. In
both cases, energy can be consumed directly and indirectly, through intermedi-
ate goods consumption. Using overall energy intensity allows us to account for
potential substitution effects between natural gas and other energy sources. This
help allay some of the concerns that arise because we use IO tables related to
pre-shale boom era for a specific year implicitly assuming that the production
technology is fixed. Using only natural gas consumption allows us to get closer
to the source of the comparative advantage. Table 1 provides an overview of en-
ergy intensities by their IO table direct and total input cost shares at the three
digit sector level; in addition, the size of sectors relative to the overall economy
is reported as measured by their overall input cost share. The most energy inten-
sive sectors are, not surprisingly, Petroleum and Coal Products Manufacturing,
Primary Metal Manufacturing, Non-metallic Mineral Product Manufacturing and
Chemical Manufacturing.
and Montenegro are coded as three distinct countries), or with which the U.S. did not trade at all
in any of the 158 sectors over the 16 years.
25See Appendix A.3 for details. The trade data can be matched with the 7 digit NAICS industry
classification level; however, the best concordance between the six digit IO tables and the trade
data is achieved at the 5 digit NAICS sector level.
26The details of the construction are discussed in appendix A.4.
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In the next section, we present the empirical specifications and discuss the
underlying identifying assumptions in detail.
5 Empirical Specification
We now outline the empirical specifications that we estimate to explore the effect
of the U.S. natural gas endowment shock on manufacturing sector output, the
allocation of factors of production and, finally, on international trade.
5.1 Factor Allocation and Output Effects
In the first set of exercises, we present evidence supporting the first two theoret-
ical prediction, suggesting that the shale gas boom induced an expansion of the
manufacturing sectors of the economy that use more energy.
In order to do so, we estimate variants of the following two empirical specifi-
cations. First,
yjt = αj + dj′t + ljqt + γ× Ej × ∆Pt + ǫjt (4)
As dependent variable we study national outcome measures yjt, gross output,
employment or capital investment, specific to a set of five digit sectors j at time t.
Our coefficient of interest is the estimate γ, which captures the differential ef-
fect of the increase in the natural gas price gap Pt between the U.S. and OECD
Europe across sectors j that have a different degree of energy usage in their pro-
duction process, captured by the energy intensity measure Ej. As such, the vari-
ation that we exploit is across industries and over time and not spatial by nature.
The estimated coefficient γ can be interpreted as a semi-elasticity that captures
the proportional change in the outcome variable yjt for every dollar increase in
the price gap for a hypothetical sector that uses only energy as an input.
A natural concern is that prices themselves are an equilibrium outcome. This
affects the interpretation of our results. As discussed in the theoretical section, we
explore the effects of an exogenous shift of the general equilibrium and as such,
we estimate the equilibrium response as our parameter of interest. Hence, we
interpret our estimates as capturing a comparative static rather than measuring a
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partial effect.
We employ three sets of fixed effects to address concerns about omitted vari-
ables, in particular, of unobserved trends. The first fixed effect, αj, absorbs time-
invariant confounders that are specific to a sector j, and thus remove a lot of the
time-invariant industry specific fundamentals.
Five digit NAICS sectors j are nested into meaningful coarser sector classifica-
tions j′, where j′ ⊂ j.27 We make our time fixed effects dj′t specific to sub-sectors
j′, which allows us to rule out time varying shocks that may affect similar sectors
j ⊂ j′ equally, such as regulatory changes or demand shocks. Throughout the
paper, we will make the non-linear time effects specific to the two digit sector
level.
It is important to highlight that oil and gas extraction activities are excluded
throughout from the analysis. The focus of this paper is on the indirect effects of
the shale gas boom on the manufacturing sector. Nevertheless, some manufactur-
ing sectors may be directly affected by oil and gas extraction activities through
downstream IO linkages, whereby manufacturing sectors are expanding as they
provide inputs to the oil and gas extraction activities (such as tubes). As such,
the expansion in these sectors could be driven by the indirect benefits due to
the IO linkages. The third fixed effect ljqt aims to reduce concerns about such
linkages of individual sectors to the oil and gas extraction sectors affecting our
estimated coefficients. We compute direct input requirements of the oil and gas
extraction sectors drawing on inputs from five digit manufacturing sectors. We
then construct quintiles q that capture the strength of the respective linkage of
manufacturing sector j to the oil and gas extraction sectors. In the regression, we
control for the linkages flexibly using strength of linkage by year fixed effects,
which allows sectors with different strength of linkages to the mining sector to
evolve differently over time.
The second main empirical exercise is a non-parametric version that, rather
than exploiting the time-variation captured in the natural gas price gap Pt, asks
the data to reveal the dynamics of the evolution of the dependent variable yjt that
27Just to give an example, NAICS code 31 captures mostly non-durable consumption goods,
such as 311 Food Processing or 315 Apparel Manufacturing.
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is correlated with the energy intensity Ej. The empirical specification is
yjt = αj + dj′t + ljqt + ∑
t
γt × Ej + ǫjt (5)
Inspecting the plotted estimates γt will allow us to explore the extent to which
sectors, of different energy intensity, were evolving similarly prior to the dramatic
divergence in natural gas prices between the U.S. and the rest of the world.
The next section presents the empirical strategy for the analysis of the trade
data.
5.2 International Trade
The exposition of the empirical strategy for international trade only differs in
two aspects from the previous ones. First, our dependent variable ydjt will now
capture a trade outcome, such as the log value of exports from sector j to a desti-
nation d at time t or the log value of imports coming from origin d and classified
as belonging to sector j. Secondly, the fixed effects will be slightly different. The
main specification is as follows:
ydjt = αdj + ljqt + bdj′t + γ× Ej × ∆Pt + ǫdjt (6)
We control for five digit sector code j by destination d fixed effects bdj. These
would capture any time-invariant factors that affect, say, demand from China for
U.S. energy intensive goods. These fixed effects also capture, for instance, bilateral
distance and other time-invariant sector specific trade frictions. Similarly, we also
flexibly control for linkages with the oil and gas extraction sectors, ljqt, which may
affect trade directly through the imports or reduced exports of inputs required for
oil and gas extraction.
The trade-pair specific time fixed effects αdj′t control for time varying shocks
that are specific to a trade-pair. Some examples of variables that would be cap-
tured with this are demand shifters, such as annual GDP, population, trade agree-
ments, general time varying trade costs and exchange rates. Even more so, we make
these fixed effects specific to a coarser sector level j′; throughout, we will allow
these trade pair specific non-linear time trends to be heterogenous at the two digit
sector level. As mentioned, the two digit sector level captures broad distinctions
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between durable and non-durable manufacturing outputs and we de facto control
for sector specific time varying trade costs and demand shocks.28
The identifying variation is coming from the variation in energy intensity mea-
sured by Ej across sector codes within a set of sectors that are quite similar, as they
all belong both to the same two digit sector main codes. Since we are mainly us-
ing logged trade measures, the coefficient of interest, γ, is a semi-elasticity that
captures the proportional change in trade for every dollar increase in the price
gap for a hypothetical sector that uses only energy as an input.
The fixed effects allow for a relaxed identification assumption: all that is re-
quired for the estimates γ to capture the causal effect of the shale gas boom, is that
industries within the same two digit industry classification would have followed
parallel trends in the respective outcome variables, if the shale gas boom had
not occurred. As in the factor-reallocation and output exercise, we can present
evidence in favor of this identification assumption by exploring the evolution of
the coefficients γt over time; positive coefficients would indicate that exports of
energy intensive products is growing stronger, relative to non-energy intensive
sectors. We estimate the following specification:
ydjt = αdj′t + bdj + ljqt + ∑
t
γt × Ej + ǫdjt (7)
The results from the non-parametric exercise are presented graphically, thus
highlighting the evolution of trade volumes accounting for the energy intensity of
the respective goods. In the main tables, we focus on US exports to all countries
and work off the natural gas price gap as measured between the U.S. and OECD
Europe or between the U.S. and individual OECD member countries, whenever
such price data is available. In the appendix, we also explore other price differ-
ences and the results are very similar throughout, which is not too surprising, as
the variation in the price gaps that is relevant is not driven by prices changing
elsewhere in the world, but rather by U.S. prices dropping dramatically.29
28We provide an evaluation of U.S. export tariffs in Appendix B, where we argue that the resid-
ual variation after controlling for our fixed effects is not problematic.
29The results are presented in Appendix Tables A3 and A4). As noted, the original trade data
also provide a further spatial component in form of the U.S. customs district, where the export
data was recorded. Appendix D shows that we obtain very similar results when accounting for the
customs origin district on an unbalanced panel to exploit within U.S. natural gas price differences.
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We now turn to presenting the results from our empirical exercise, along with
some robustness checks.
6 Results
We present our results in the same sequence as before, first exploring domestic
factor allocation and output effects, then turning to the trade results.
6.1 Factor Allocation and Output Effects
The results on the effect of the shale gas boom on gross output, employment,
and capital investment are depicted in table 2. Panel A presents the effect of the
shale gas boom on gross output across sectors. The estimated effect is positive
throughout and significant, suggesting that energy intensive sectors of the econ-
omy expand differentially as natural gas prices drop. The coefficient implies that,
in the case of Chemical Manufacturing, which has a total energy cost share of
8.33 %, output expands by 8.33%× 19.1% = 1.59% for every dollar that the price
gap increases. Note that, even though the mining linkage year effects control to
some extent for the direct effects of shale gas extraction, since we use national
level output data the estimated effect may be considered an upper bound.
Panel B presents the results for employment. Throughout again, the coeffi-
cient is positive and significant, suggesting that employment in energy intensive
manufacturing sector in counties far away from the shale extraction sites expands
significantly. The coefficients imply that employment in Chemical Manufacturing
expands by 8.33%× 7.4% = 0.6% for every dollar that the price gap increases. We
can perform another back of the envelope calculation to scale the effect. Given
that the average industry has an energy cost share around 5%, we estimate that
employment increased, on average, by 3.6% up to the year 2012, when the natural
gas price gap stood near USD 10. Using the average sector level employment, we
can arrive at an overall estimate of the employment gains: total manufacturing
sector employment in counties not located above or near shale deposits increased
by around 356,000 jobs in the year 2012 after the shale gas boom. This is around
0.2% of the overall size of the labor force in 2012. Note that this estimate captures
the indirect employment effects due to the shale gas boom, rather than the direct
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economic stimulation due to extraction activity as we focus on energy intensive
employment in places far away from shale gas extraction. We can relate this es-
timate to the findings in the existing literature on local economic effects. Fetzer
(2014) finds local employment gains of around 600,000 jobs, while Feyrer et al.
(2015) find slightly larger estimates of around 750,000; this suggests that the in-
direct employment gains in the manufacturing sector range from 0.47 to 0.59 for
every job created due to extraction activity and its directly associated spillovers.
Exploring overall employment levels, there is some evidence suggesting a rever-
sal of a trend in manufacturing sector employment, which the shale gas boom
has contributed to. Over our sample period, manufacturing sector employment
shrank from around 16.7 million jobs in the year 2000, to a low of 11.1 million
in 2010. This trend has been widely associated with increased Chinese import
competition and has been studied, for example, in Autor et al. (2013). Since 2010
however, the aggregate trend in our data has reversed with employment having
recovered by around 400,000 to 11.5 million in 2013. Similarly studying our ag-
gregated data suggests that the most energy intensive manufacturing sectors with
NAICS codes 324-331 have added around 140,000 jobs alone.
Panel C presents the result for capital expenditure in counties located far from
shale deposits. Again, and consistent with the theory, the coefficient is positive
and large in magnitude, albeit estimated imprecisely. The p-values range from
0.14 to 0.19. It is unsurprising that the coefficient estimates come with limited
confidence, as the dependent variable is measured with a lot of noise. The coef-
ficients suggest that investment in a hypothetical sector that uses only energy as
input would expand by close to 40% for every dollar increase in the price gap.
For Chemical Manufacturing again, the (noisily) estimated capital expenditure
increase is 8.33% × 39.4% = 3.3% for every dollar that the price gap increases.
For the average industry with an energy cost share around 5%, capital investment
increased by 20% for the year 2012, when the price gap stood near USD 10. Since
the average annual investment in non-shale counties is around USD 300 million
by sector and year, simply scaling the coefficient implies increased investment
due the shale gas boom by an order of magnitude or by around USD 10 billion
for 2012. Overall, the estimated effects on factor reallocation are also in line with
the quantitative predictions of our model.
Next, we present the results from estimating the non-parametric specification
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(5), which allows the energy intensity Ej to affect outcomes flexibly over time.
Thus we assess the extent to which the dynamics move in a similar way as the
price gap and speak to the common trends assumption inherent to this research
design.
The results for our three outcome measures are presented in Figure 4. Panel A
presents the result for gross output. For the years 2000 to 2003, the coefficient is
close to zero, but it becomes positive and significant from 2004 onwards. This is
not surprising as our national aggregate measures are likely to be affected by the
direct economic effects of shale oil and gas extraction, since for lack of spatially
disaggregated sector level data, we are not able to remove data coming from
places that are directly affected due to the extraction activity. When we introduce
the results for employment and capital investment below, where we can explicitly
remove data coming from places that see a lot of economic activity due to shale
extraction, this early pick up is not present.
Panel B presents the employment results. Throughout the period from 2000 to
2006, the coefficient estimates suggest that manufacturing sector employment did
not grow at differential rates in a way that is correlated with the energy intensity.
From 2007 onwards, the employment starts to increase significantly. This suggests
a slight lag, since global natural gas markets already decoupled in 2006. A slightly
lagged effect is not surprising, since it takes time for new jobs to be created,
even more so as some require auxiliary capital investment. Additionally, the
employment data are measured in the first quarter of the respective year, which
mechanically contributes to a lagged effect.
In panel C we present the results for capital investment. The data are only
available from 2003 onwards, but, reassuringly, the estimated coefficients on the
interaction are flat for 2004 and 2005 and only become positive from 2006 on-
wards, which coincides with the price gap, which significantly widens. After-
wards, the estimated coefficient is positive throughout, albeit volatile, which can
be traced back to the volatile nature of capital investments. In sum, the results
suggest that sectors with different energy consumption were evolving on similar
trends prior to the shale gas boom.
Overall, the evidence presented so far suggests that output and factors of pro-
duction move in the way theoretically predicted and, for the variables where we
can vastly reduce concerns about the effects being spuriously driven by the direct
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extraction activities, we can offer reassuring empirical support for the parallel
trends assumption. We now turn to the main focus of the paper, exploring the
effect on U.S. energy intensive exports.
6.2 Trade
The significant price gaps that are a result of the dramatic expansion of production
and inability to trade shale gas directly, give U.S. manufacturing a cost advantage,
in particular, for energy intensive goods. In this section, we present our empir-
ical evidence for a dramatic expansion in energy intensive manufacturing sector
exports due to the emergence of the natural gas price gap.
Our main results are presented in Table 3. Panel A shows effects estimated on
the unbalanced panel of log value of trade. The results suggest that, for Chem-
ical Manufacturing, exports increase by 8.33% × 39.4% = 1.6% for every dollar
increase in the natural gas price gap. This effect is similar in magnitude to the
output effect.30
If we scale up the point estimate, given that the price gap has widened to USD
10 per cubic foot of natural gas in 2012, we find that the average manufacturing
sector exports (with an energy intensity of around 5%) have expanded by 10 %.
Overall, the results suggest an expansion of manufacturing sector exports by USD
101 billion for 2012 due to the shale gas boom. This amounts to roughly 4.4% of
the overall value of exports of goods and services from the U.S. in 2012. It is
interesting to relate this figure with a crude estimate of the trade collapse and
general trade volumes. Over the sample period from 1997 to 2012, the value of
all manufacturing goods exported more than doubled, increasing from USD 502
billion to 1,070 billion. The trade collapse in the wake of the financial crisis is
not far away from our estimate for the energy intensive manufacturing export
expansion: from 2008 to 2009, manufacturing exports shrank by USD 185 billion,
dropping from USD 916 billion to 731 billion. The above results suggest that the
cost advantage due to the shale gas boom may have helped the U.S. economy
recover significantly faster.
In panel B we explore import effects, imposing the U.S. energy coefficients.
30They are also roughly in line with what we expected given the quantitative predictions of our
stylized model.
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We see no differential change. This is at odds with the theoretical results, which
would suggest a reduction of energy intensive imports – in fact, this is not fully
unanticipated. As Leontief (1953) conjectured in his seminal paper and as Trefler
(1995) and Davis and Weinstein (2001) later on confirmed, the assumption of
symmetric technologies across countries is add odds with the data in a way that
obfuscates patterns consistent with endowment driven theories of comparative
advantage. A second complication is afforded by IO linkages that prevent imports
from dropping dramatically, if the production of energy intensive goods makes
use of imported intermediary goods that also require a significant amount of
energy inputs. We will address this ‘import puzzle’ in the next section.
Panel C and D present the results for the extensive margin of exports and im-
ports, estimated on the full balanced panel. The coefficients are small and not al-
ways precisely estimated. However, they present a consistent picture, suggesting
that it is more likely that the U.S. start to export energy intensive manufacturing
goods and is less likely to start importing them. The effects are, however, small
compared to the overall sample mean of the dependent variable. This suggests
that the bulk of the expansion in trade is coming from countries that the U.S. has
been trading with in the past.31
We now turn to showing that our key empirical result, which documents an
expansion of energy intensive manufacturing exports, is robust to a number of
possible concerns.
Robustness and Ruling Out Alternative Explanations There are two main threats
to our empirical strategy. First, we are concerned about the extent to which the
common trends assumption is satisfied, and secondly, there are concerns that our
measure of energy intensity is spuriously related to some other industry specific
cost share measure. In this part of the paper, we also try to address the puzzling
finding on the import response.
We begin by presenting evidence in support of the identification assumption
of common trends, inspecting the evolution of trade outcomes of energy intensive
manufacturing sectors relative to less energy intensive ones. The results are pre-
31In Appendix Table A8 we zoom in on the pairs with which the U.S. had consistently had
positive trade throughout the 16 year period of our sample. The point estimates are slightly
larger, suggesting again that the bulk of the effect is coming from the intensive margin of trade.
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sented graphically in Figure 5. The dynamic of the estimated coefficient follows
broadly the pattern of the price gap. The estimated coefficients hover around zero
before 2006, and pick up in dynamics only from the mid 2000s onwards, which is
consistent with the timing of the endowment shock. The average of the estimates
prior to 2006 is insignificant and close to zero, while it is positive and significant
for the period from 2006 onwards. The point estimate suggests an increase in ex-
ports close to 2 log points for a hypothetical sector that uses only energy as input,
relative to the year 1997.
Regarding our measure of energy intensity Ej, there are two aspects: first, the
measure may be a noisy estimate, which introduces attenuation bias. Second,
there could be concerns that this measure is capturing some other sector specific
trend that is picked up by the estimate. We address these in turn.
First, we explore the extent to which our results are due to the choice of energy
intensity measure Ej. Rather than imposing a noisy estimate Ej, we can estimate
separate effects γj for each sector j. For example, we can explore heterogeneous
effects across three digit sectors by estimating:
ydjt = αdj′t + bdj + ljqt + ∑
j′∈NAICS3
γj′ × ∆Pt + ǫdjt (8)
The results from this analysis are presented in Table 5. The omitted sector j′
is ”Computer and Electronic Product Manufacturing”, which is the least energy
intensive sector at the three digit level. The estimated effect is positive for most
sectors, and, in particular, positively correlated with the energy intensity mea-
sure. Unsurprisingly, the largest effects are estimated for the most energy inten-
sive manufacturing sectors, such as Chemical Manufacturing, Petroleum Products
Manufacturing and Primary Metal Manufacturing. In the table, we also report the
overall share of manufacturing sector exports over the sample periods. From 1997
to 2012, manufacturing sector exports more than doubled. This expansion is not
homogeneous across manufacturing sectors: Chemical manufacturing, a sector
that benefits widely from cheap energy, expanded its share of exports by around
1/3 from 13.4% prior to 2006 to around 18.4% over the period from 2006 to 2012.
Secondly, the energy intensity measure interacted with the price gap may cap-
ture some other industry specific non-linear trend in exports or imports that is
wrongly attributed to the shale gas boom. There could, for example, be a secular
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trend away from exporting labor intensive manufacturing sector output. Since
factor cost shares are mechanically related, we may wrongly attribute the trend
towards energy intensive exports as a trend away from capital or labor intensive
exports. Another concern is the tight oil boom that accompanied the shale gas
boom. While in the main table, we highlight that we obtain similar results when
our energy intensity measure zooms in on natural gas input requirements, there
are still concerns that we capture the effect of the shale oil endowment shock,
which has also caused the emergence of small price gaps in crude oil prices in
2011 and 2012, as shown in Appendix Figure A3.
In Table 6 we present results accounting for other industry level characteristics
interacted with the price gap and control for highly demanding trends to alleviate
these concerns. Column (1) presents the baseline results for exports. In column
(2) we add further interactions, allowing the natural gas price gap to affect capital
and labor intensive sectors differentially. Importantly, the coefficient on exports
remains strongly positively associated with exports. In column (3) we control for
linear trends that are specific to a five digit sector by trading partner level. This
is an extremely saturated model as evidenced by an overall R2 of 92%. The linear
trends account, for example, for trends in exporting of capital versus labor inten-
sive goods. The point estimate becomes smaller, but remains highly statistically
significant.
Columns (4) - (6) explore the extent to which the crude oil price difference car-
ries significant signal. Using the crude oil price difference instead of the natural
gas price difference in column (4), we see that energy intensive exports increase
the cheaper crude oil in the U.S. is relative to Europe. In column (5) we see that
this effect completely disappears when we include both crude oil price differences
and the natural gas price gap, which indicates that the signal is coming from the
natural gas as non-tradable factor of production. In column (6) we again include
the highly demanding linear trends and see that the results are broadly similar.
Measurement Error in Import Energy Intensity A central challenge in the liter-
ature testing the Heckscher-Ohlin prediction of comparative advantage and rel-
ative factor abundance is measurement of production technology. While we are
confident that we capture the energy requirements adequately for the U.S., impos-
ing that the production technology – in this case the energy intensity for an output
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– is the same across countries is a strong assumption. The puzzling finding of no
negative effect on imports is suggestive that we may simply be mis-measuring
the factor intensity for the foreign countries. One way to address this is to turn
to country specific IO tables and to estimate energy intensities for different coun-
tries. We use the World Input Output Tables (WIOT) to arrive at estimates of
energy intensity of sectors at a coarse three digit sector resolution. Unfortunately,
these data are only available for 40 countries and there is no meaningful exten-
sive margin, since the 40 countries account for the bulk of all U.S. trade. We can
use energy intensities at the three digit sector level to re-estimate the export and
import regressions.
The results are presented in Table 4. Columns (1) and (2) use the U.S. three
digit WIOT technology coefficients. In Panel A we present the results on exports,
while Panel B explores imports. The export coefficient is positive as expected,
while the import coefficient is now negative, but small in magnitude and impre-
cisely estimated. In Columns (3) and (4) we use the respective trading country’s
technology coefficient. The point estimate for U.S. exports is similar in magnitude
to the point estimate we obtained when using the “correct” U.S. technology co-
efficients, while the import coefficients are again negative but insignificant. This
exercise suggests that at a coarse resolution, U.S. and non U.S. technology coef-
ficients may be fairly similar, irrespective of what measure is used. While not
statistically significant, we find consistently negative coefficients on the import
coefficients and, using geographically refined natural gas price differences, these
become just marginally statistically insignificant (see appendix table A9 for re-
gional natural gas price differences).
Further Concerns Our estimates of the impact of the shale gas boom on man-
ufacturing sector trade may be underestimated for two further reasons. First,
bordering countries such as Canada and Mexico may directly benefit from ex-
ports of U.S. shale gas. This spillover effect would induce us to underestimate
the true effect of the shale gas boom. We can address this by removing Canada
and Mexico from the estimating sample, the results are widely unaffected as in-
dicated in Appendix table A5. The second concern is that of fuel displacement:
shale gas and regulatory action is displacing U.S. produced coal for power gen-
eration as documented in Knittel et al. (2015). This may depress coal prices on
33
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
world markets and induce fuel substitution towards coal, which depresses nat-
ural gas prices. Indeed, U.S. coal exports increased dramatically between 2006
and 2012. Yet, even in the peak year, U.S. coal exports only account for 1.48% of
a growing world coal demand and thus we expect that fuel substitution towards
coal only has a second order effect on natural gas prices.
7 Conclusion
This paper provides empirical evidence of the effects of a plausibly exogenous
change in relative factor prices – the price of natural gas – on production and, im-
portantly, international trade. We use differences in endowment of natural gas to
contribute to a long standing literature testing the implications of relative factor
abundance on specialization and trade outcomes. In line with our theoretical pre-
dictions, we showed that the shale gas boom has induced an relative expansion
of energy intensive manufacturing in the U.S., which consequently led to factor
reallocation, in particular of capital and labor. We then turned to studying man-
ufacturing sector exports and found that U.S. manufacturing exports have grown
by about 10 percent on account of their energy intensity since the onset of the
shale revolution.
Our findings and identification strategy constitute a novel way to empirically
test the heirloom prediction by Heckscher and Ohlin that countries export their
abundant factors, and more generally the neo-classical predictions regarding the
effects of changes in factor prices. In doing so, our work abstracts from IO link-
ages, leaving the intricacies of trade in value added largely untouched. In a world
dominated by global supply chains, further research could help deepen our un-
derstanding of shocks to factor supply.
Looking forward, the recent removal of restrictions on crude oil exports from
the U.S. would be more consequential than for natural gas in increasing domestic
prices and in reducing international crude oil prices, considering the much higher
degree of tradability of oil. Indeed, liquefaction and transportation costs would
make exporting liquefied natural gas economical only at relatively high prices
prevailing in other markets. The price differential between the U.S. compared to
Asia and Europe is thus likely to persist in turn helping to lift U.S. manufacturing.
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Tables and Figures for Main Text
Table 1: Energy Intensity and Relative Sector Size of Exporting NAICS3 Sectors according
to 2002 IO Table
Industry NAICS Sector Size Energy Cost Natural Gas Cost Labour Cost
Total Direct Total Direct Total Direct
Food Manufacturing 311 2.36% 4.08% 2.02% 1.87% 0.85% 26.76% 13.59%
Beverage and Tobacco 312 0.62% 2.26% 0.85% 0.94% 0.27% 17.94% 7.54%
Textile Mills 313 0.23% 5.83% 3.26% 2.14% 0.85% 38.18% 21.96%
Textile Product Mill 314 0.16% 3.46% 1.25% 1.34% 0.47% 33.40% 18.68%
Apparel Manufacturin 315 0.21% 3.06% 1.31% 1.72% 0.75% 39.09% 20.54%
Leather and Allied P 316 0.03% 2.62% 1.20% 1.25% 0.52% 37.71% 22.89%
Wood Product Manufac 321 0.46% 3.31% 1.77% 1.23% 0.41% 37.97% 22.91%
Paper Manufacturing 322 0.79% 7.65% 3.82% 4.33% 1.75% 32.68% 18.80%
Printing and Related 323 0.51% 3.00% 1.28% 1.24% 0.29% 47.78% 33.17%
Petroleum and Coal P 324 1.10% 78.21% 66.09% 76.24% 65.31% 12.74% 3.55%
Chemical Manufacturi 325 2.30% 8.33% 3.11% 5.90% 1.63% 28.33% 12.45%
Plastics and Rubber 326 0.88% 4.33% 2.22% 1.56% 0.39% 38.76% 24.85%
Nonmetallic Mineral 327 0.48% 8.38% 4.28% 4.60% 2.06% 40.59% 25.21%
Primary Metal Manufa 331 0.72% 9.15% 4.86% 3.57% 1.55% 36.55% 21.76%
Fabricated Metal Pro 332 1.25% 3.57% 1.56% 1.44% 0.49% 45.85% 29.97%
Machinery Manufactur 333 1.23% 2.27% 0.81% 0.82% 0.19% 44.75% 25.95%
Computer and Electro 334 1.79% 1.73% 0.74% 0.46% 0.13% 42.45% 22.00%
Electrical Equipment 335 0.51% 2.36% 0.97% 0.78% 0.23% 39.41% 23.55%
Transportation Equip 336 3.25% 1.85% 0.63% 0.63% 0.19% 37.99% 18.19%
Furniture and Relate 337 0.38% 2.38% 0.93% 0.77% 0.22% 44.90% 29.23%
Miscellaneous Manufa 339 0.64% 1.80% 0.71% 0.57% 0.15% 41.46% 27.39%
39
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
Table 2: Effect of natural gas price gap on energy intensive gross manufacturing
output, employment and capital expenditure between 2000 and 2013.
All Energy Inputs Natural Gas Input
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Direct Direct + Indirect Direct Direct + Indirect
Panel A: Gross Output
Energy Intensity 0.181*** 0.191*** 0.183*** 0.194***
× Price Gap (0.036) (0.034) (0.038) (0.040)
Sectors 150 150 150 150
Observations 2100 2100 2100 2100
R-squared .963 .964 .963 .964
Panel B: Employment
Energy Intensity 0.066*** 0.074*** 0.061*** 0.071***
× Price Gap (0.020) (0.019) (0.014) (0.017)
Sectors 171 171 171 171
Observations 2386 2386 2386 2386
R-squared .969 .969 .969 .969
Panel C: Capital Expenditures
Energy Intensity 0.370 0.394 0.316 0.382
× Price Gap (0.275) (0.261) (0.246) (0.272)
Sectors 171 171 171 171
Observations 1881 1881 1881 1881
R-squared .639 .639 .638 .639
Mining Linkage x Year FE X X X X
5 Digit Industry FE X X X X
2 Digit Industry x Year FE X X X X
Notes: Price Gap is measured as the difference between an OECD average natural gas price
and the US industrial use natural gas price. The dependent variable in Panel A is the log of
gross output in a given sector. The dependent variable in Panel B is the log(employment) by five
digit sector aggregated across counties not located above or near shale deposits. The dependent
variable in Panel C is a log(capital expenditures), again aggregated excluding counties located
above or near shale deposits. The Energy Intensity measure used in columns (1) and (2) focus on
all types of energy consumed, while the measure used in columns (3) and (4) focus on natural gas
consumption. Columns (1) and (3) use only direct energy consumption, while columns (2) and
(4) also includes indirect energy input through intermediate goods. Standard errors are clustered
at the four digit sector level with stars indicating *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table 3: Effect of natural gas price gap on energy intensive export, import values on the
extensive and intensive margin between 1997 and 2012.
All Energy Inputs Natural Gas Input
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Direct Direct + Indirect Direct Direct + Indirect
Panel A: Overall Export Value
Energy Intensity 0.205*** 0.193*** 0.210*** 0.200***
× Price Gap (0.022) (0.018) (0.022) (0.019)
Clusters 218 218 218 218
Observations 358603 358603 358603 358603
R-squared .893 .893 .893 .893
Panel B: Overall Import Value
Energy Intensity -0.006 0.024 0.001 0.028
× Price Gap (0.032) (0.027) (0.031) (0.027)
Clusters 216 216 216 216
Observations 207471 207471 207471 207471
R-squared .906 .906 .906 .906
Panel C: Any Export
Energy Intensity 0.002 0.004** 0.000 0.003
× Price Gap (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Mean of DV .655 .655 .655 .655
Clusters 218 218 218 218
Observations 551104 551104 551104 551104
R-squared .713 .713 .713 .713
Panel D: Any Import
Energy Intensity -0.006** -0.005** -0.004 -0.003
× Price Gap (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Mean of DV .384 .384 .384 .384
Clusters 218 218 218 218
Observations 551104 551104 551104 551104
R-squared .754 .754 .754 .754
All specifications include
Country x 5 Digit Industry FE X X X X
Country x 2 Digit Industry x Year FE X X X X
Oil and Gas Linkage x Year FE X X X X
Notes: Price Gap is measured as the difference between an OECD average industrial use natural gas price
and the US industrial use natural gas price. The dependent variable in Panel A and B are the logged values
of exports and imports respectively. The dependent variable in Panel C and Panel D is a dummy that takes
the value of 1 in case of non-zero exports (imports) in a sector and year respectively. The Energy Intensity
measures used throughout are at the five digit sector level and come from the U.S. IO table. Columns (1)
and (2) focus on all types of energy consumed, while the measure used in columns (3) and (4) focus on
natural gas consumption. Columns (1) and (3) use only direct energy consumption, while columns (2) and
(4) also includes indirect energy input through intermediate goods. Standard errors are clustered at the
destination country level with stars indicating *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table 4: World-IO Table Energy Intensity Measures: Effect of natural gas price gap on energy
intensive export, import values on the extensive and intensive margin between 1997 and 2012.
US WIOT Requirements Trading Country WIOT Requirements
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Direct Direct + Indirect Direct Direct + Indirect
Panel A: Overall Export Value
Energy Intensity 0.151*** 0.131*** 0.155*** 0.125***
× Price Gap (0.027) (0.021) (0.020) (0.017)
Clusters 39 39 39 39
Observations 96554 96554 96554 96554
R-squared .919 .919 .919 .919
Panel B: Overall Import Value
Energy Intensity -0.039 -0.012 -0.029 -0.015
× Price Gap (0.046) (0.035) (0.037) (0.027)
Clusters 39 39 39 39
Observations 88098 88098 88098 88098
R-squared .913 .913 .913 .913
All specifications include
5 Digit Industry FE X X X X
2 Digit Industry x Year FE X X X X
Oil and Gas Linkage x Year FE X X X X
Notes: Price Gap is measured as the difference between an OECD average natural gas price and the US industrial
use natural gas price. The sample is restricted to the set of countries for which IO table requirement coefficients
could be computed from the WIOT. The dependent variable in Panel A and B are the logged values of exports
and imports respectively. All regressions include five digit sector by destination/origin FE and two digit sector by
destination/origin by year FE. The Energy Intensity measures used throughout varies across 14 three digit sectors
constructed from the WIOT tables. Columns (1) and (2) focus on U.S. WIOT direct and total energy consumption,
while columns (3) and (4) use the relevant energy intensity measures for the trading country. Standard errors are
clustered at the destination country level with stars indicating *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table 6: Robustness of Export Effect: Controlling for other sector cost shares, trends
and accounting for oil price gaps
Other Controls Oil Prices
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Energy Intensity x Price Gap 0.132*** 0.098*** 0.061*** 0.126*** 0.050***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.018) (0.017) (0.018)
Capital Intensity x -0.053*** 0.019
Price Gap (0.007) (0.012)
Labor Intensity -0.089*** -0.009
× Price Gap (0.009) (0.014)
Energy Intensity x 0.125*** 0.011 0.016
(Brent - WTI) Crude Price (0.013) (0.011) (0.012)
Country x 5 Digit Industry FE X X X X X X
Country x 2 Digit Industry x Year FE X X X X X X
Oil and Gas Linkage x Year FE X X X X X X
Country x 5 Digit Industry FE Trend X X
Clusters 218 218 218 218 218 218
Observations 358603 358603 358603 358603 358603 358603
R-squared .893 .893 .924 .893 .893 .924
Notes: Table presents some robustness checks on the export results. Columns (1) - (3) includes further
controls and interactions, while columns (4)-(6) include various oil prices and their interactions with the
energy intensity. Standard errors are clustered by destination country with stars indicating *** p < 0.01,
** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Figure 5: Evolution of natural gas price gap and exports. Figure present results
from a non-parametric regression interacting the direct energy cost share with a
set of year fixed effects on the logged value of exports at the five digit sector level,
controlling for five digit sector by destination fixed effects, as well as three digit
sector by destination and year fixed effects.
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A Data Appendix
This section provides further details on the physics of natural gas shipping. It
furthermore discusses and provides more details about the underlying data used
in the empirical exercises.
A.1 The Physics of Natural Gas Transportation
Differences in regional natural gas prices are fundamentally determined by the
laws of physics through the bearing the latter have on both transformation and
transportation costs. For pipeline transportation, the cost relates to the frictions
that arise as natural gas travels through pipelines. Natural gas transportation via
pipelines between the U.S. and other major markets such as Europe and Asia is
however not a viable option, due to the long distance natural gas would need to
travel. This requires re-compression along the way due to the natural friction,
which is not possible beneath the sea surface given existing technology. To be
traded, U.S. natural gas would thus need to be shipped and that requires lique-
faction. For liquefaction of natural gas, the costs arise due to the work required to
compress and cool down natural gas to achieve a phase change from gas to liquid.
This occurs at temperatures of around -160 degrees celsius (-256 degrees Fahren-
heit). The gas is then compressed to only 1/600th its original volume. Natural gas
has a heating value of around Q = 890kJ/mole. The minimum energy required to
liquefy natural gas is implied by the first law of thermodynamics. This minimum
energy requirement has two components. First, there is an energy requirement
in order to cool down natural gas. The amount of energy required for that is
dictated by the specific heat of natural gas. The specific heat of substance mea-
sures how thermally insensitive it is to the addition of energy. A larger value for
the specific heat means that more energy must be added for any given mass in
order to achieve a change in temperature. For natural gas that constant is given
by cp = 2.098
J
g◦ , meaning that 2.098 Joules of energy are required to achieve a 1
degree change per gram of natural gas at constant pressure. The second compo-
nent of the energy requirement is the energy required to achieve a phase change.
A phase change consists in the change in physical properties from gaseous to liq-
uid and then to solid. A phase change does not involve a change in temperature
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but rather a change in the internal energy of the substance. The amount of en-
ergy required to achieve a phase change from gaseous to liquid is given by the
substances latent heat of vaporization, for natural gas that is ∆Hv = 502J/g.
From the above, we can compute the implied minimal energy required to cool
down natural gas and achieve a phase change as follows:
Ql,min = Wl,min = cp∆T + ∆Hv
The minimal energy required to liquefy natural gas from 20 degrees to -160
degrees is 14.1 kJ/mole. This does not seem that significant in relation to the heat
content of 890 kJ/mole, accounting for only 1.6% of the heat content. However, the
actual work required is a lot higher since the energy required to cool down and
achieve the phase change is obtained from other physical processes involving the
burning of fuel. These processes are far from achieving a 100% energy conversion
efficiency. The actual work required can be expressed as:
Wl =
Wl,min
ǫl × ǫw
where ǫw is the energy conversion efficiency of converting methane to elec-
tricity and ǫl is the efficiency factor for conversion to liquids. These shares are
significantly lower than 1. The Department of Energy estimates that ǫw = 35%,
while ǫl may range between 15% - 40% (see Wegrzyn et al. (1998)). This suggest
that the energy costs for liquefaction can range anywhere between 100kJ - 268 kJ,
suggesting energy losses range between 11.2%-30% from the liquefaction process
alone.
In addition, there are losses associated with the re-gasification process; fur-
thermore, there are costs for transport, storage, and operating costs along the
whole value chain. All these accrue in addition to the conversion costs implied
by the laws of physics. A recent analysis of a proposed LNG plant in Cyprus
suggests that the minimum liquefaction costs are 1.4 times the cost of the natural
gas feedstock.32
The inherent costs associated with transforming and transporting natural gas
thus suggest that domestic natural gas prices in the U.S. will remain significantly
32See Natural Gas Monetization Pathways for Cyprus, MIT Energy Initiative,
http://mitei.mit.edu.
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lower compared to Europe and Asia in the foreseeable future.
A.2 Domestic Data
National Level Output We work with national level output data obtained from
the BEA. The data are made available at the five digit industry resolution as na-
tional aggregate by year on http://www.bea.gov/industry/gdpbyind_data.htm.
County Business Patterns Employment Data We draw on detailed county level
employment data from the County Business Patterns (CBP). We use the five digit
NAICS sector disaggregation to produce an annual balanced panel from 2000 to
2013 and match this to energy intensities constructed at the five digit NAICS sec-
tor level from the 2002 IO tables. The CBP data provide employment during the
first week of March in a given year, the first quarter payroll and the annual pay-
roll. The fine disaggregation into five digit sector and across counties is helpful to
remove data stemming from counties that are directly affected by shale gas extrac-
tion and the associated local spillovers. As in many instances there are very few
employees in counties, for confidentiality protection the CBP data do not provide
the actual number of employees, but rather, provides the number of employees by
establishment size group. The establishment size classes are 1-4, 5-9, 10-19, 20-49,
50-99, 100-249, 250-499, 500-999, 1000 and above. In case the data are missing,
we infer the number of employees by computing the overall employment as the
number of establishments by size class, taking the midpoint employment by size
class as an estimate. This should introduce measurement error in our dependent
variable, which only affects the estimated standard errors.
In order to ensure that our results are not capturing the direct economic
spillovers due to local extraction, we remove counties from the aggregation sam-
ple that are located in the proximity of shale deposits.33 The main dependent
variable will be the log of employment by sector and year.
Capital Expenditure Data The data are available at the zip code level and pro-
vides the number of jobs created and the size of the capital expenditure as well
33We use the common Energy Information Administration Map of Shale Plays and remove any
county, that has a non-empty overlap with any shale play. This removes 24% of all counties across
the U.S., a map of the major shale plays is presented in Appendix Figure A4
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as the NAICS industry classification. For the time variable, we use the respective
date when it was entered in the dataset by Conway.
We construct a five digit level national series, providing an aggregation where
we remove capital expenditures that occur in locations that may be directly af-
fected by the shale gas boom, i.e. those located on shale plays.
A.3 Trade Data
This part of the appendix describes how the trade data of Schott (2008) were
processed to construct two data sets that are used in this paper. The two data sets
are: (1) a balanced panel of trade between the US and partner countries at the five
digit sector code level and (2) an unbalanced panel of trade between US customs
districts and trade partner countries at the five digit sector code level.
In order to arrive at the second data set, some processing of Schott (2008) data
is necessary. The data are provided at the harmonised system (HS) product code
classification for trade data. The trade data have four panel dimensions: origin
or destination US customs district c, product code j, and origin or destination
country i in year t.34 The product codes j data are mapped to 7-digit North
American Industry Classification Codes (NAICS) using the routine detailed in
Pierce and Schott (2012a). As the IO tables are computed using combined NAICS
codes for several sectors, we map the 7 digit NAICS sectors to 5 digit NAICS
sectors, by aggregating import- and export flows on the panel identifiers i, c,
t and the transformed 5 digit product code j. In total, there are 158 NAICS5
sectors, 16 years of data, 233 of countries with which the US trades and 44 US
customs districts.
The main data set used in the analysis removes the US customs district dimen-
sion by collapsing the data.
A.4 Energy Intensity from IO Tables
We use the approach discussed in Fetzer (2014) to construct the energy intensity
of the five digit industries using the 2002 BEA IO table. The IO use table provide,
34We refer to product and sector codes j interchangably here.
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for each industry, a break-down of all direct costs by commodity that the industry
incurs to achieve its level of output.
The direct energy cost is computed as the sum of the costs that an industry
incurs using direct energy commodities. Energy commodities are considered to
be those produced by the following following six digit NAICS industries:
NAICS 6 Industry Name
211000 Oil and gas extraction
221100 Electric power generation and distribution
221200 Natural gas distribution
486000 Pipeline transportation
S00101 Federal electric utilities
S00202 State electric utilities
Table A1: IO Table Direct Natural Gas Consumption
Unfortunately, the Oil and gas extraction sector is not further decomposed into
natural gas or oil extraction, which adds some noise to the measurement. Never-
theless, the table provides all direct energy consumption and captures the three
ways that natural gas can be consumed. The three ways to consume natural gas
directly follow from the deregulation of the industry which ultimately separated
natural gas extraction from transportation. This was achieved in a lengthy regula-
tory process, beginning with the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, and subsequent
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) orders No. 436 in 1985 and 636
in 1992. These orders ultimately separate the extraction from the transportation
process, mandating open access to pipelines which allows end-consumers or local
distribution companies (LDCs) to directly purchase natural gas from the produc-
ers.
The three ways natural gas is purchased for consumption are:
1. Direct Purchases from the Oil and Gas Extraction Sector, in addition to costs
for Pipeline Transportation (NAICS 211000, 486000).
2. Indirect Purchases Through Natural Gas Distribution Utilities (NAICS 2212000
and 486000).
3. Indirect Purchases Through Electric Utilities using natural gas for power
generation (NAICS 2211000, S00101 and S00202).
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Now, we can further refine this as natural gas is also indirectly consumed
through the value chain in the form of intermediate products. In order to account
for this indirect consumption, we perform the above step iteratively. Since we
know the energy cost share for each commodity, we can compute the energy
cost component of each intermediate input and simply add these costs up. We
perform this step iteratively to arrive at the overall cost shares.
We proceed in the same way to compute the labor cost share. In the IO table,
each sector reports its labor costs. We simply compute the direct and indirect
labor cost share using the same method.
Last, but not least, we compute the capital intensity of a sector. We follow the
approach in Acemoglu and Guerrieri (2006), who construct capital intensity of a
sector as:
Kj =
VAj −Wj
VAj
where VAj is nominal value added in sector j and Wj is the wage bill of that
sector. The three components of value added are (1) compensation of employ-
ees, (2) taxes on production and imports less subsidies, and (3) gross operating
surplus.
The resulting time invariant measures are merged with the trade data. For
some sectors, we have to compute the energy intensity at a four digit level, as the
NAICS codes in the IO tables combine several sector codes or are only available
at the four digit sector level.
B Tariffs
In this section we provide a more detailed discussion of export tariffs that U.S.
industries face. U.S. trade policy makers are likely to be mindful of the changes
in comparative advantage we identify over our sample period and hence put
their considerable weight behind pushing for differential liberalization for energy
intensive products. Consequently, omitting tariffs in our regressions may bias
our estimates upwards. In the main text, we argue that given our estimation
strategy we need to be wary of differential variation of export tariffs within two
digit sectors over time.
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The WTO has created a world of relatively low tariffs for developed countries
and hence for the vast majority of international trade flows of manufactured pro-
duce. While MFN tariff changes are therefore small by necessity and hence less
likely to affect our results considerably (we explore this further below), trade lib-
eralization via free trade agreements (FTAs) is a first order concern. These may
be targeted at important markets for relatively energy intensive goods and hence
magnify our reduced form estimates.
During our sample period, the U.S. struck free trade agreements with the fol-
lowing countries: Jordan (2001), Australia (2004), Chile (2004), Singapore (2004),
Bahrain (2006), Morocco (2006), Oman (2006), Peru (2007), DR-CAFTA, (which
includes Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and the Do-
minican Republic 2005), Panama (2012), Colombia (2012), and South Korea (2012).
The Colombia and South Korea agreements could affect our results only in the
last three years of our sample period, so that our identification strategy is unim-
peached during the crucial periods just after 2006. Among the earlier FTA’s, in
terms of economic weight in the U.S. export basket, only the ones with three
countries may raise concerns: Australia, Chile, and Singapore. These, however,
accounted for only 0.9%, 0.7%, and 1.2%, respectively, of total U.S. international
trade in 2015. Overall, we therefore conclude that FTAs do not appear to be a
major concern for our results.
The U.S. may still have pushed for differential liberalization in the WTO frame-
work and hence we examine the (small) U.S. MFN export tariffs. We merge tariff
information from TRAINS to our main data set at the 5 digit sector level. The
amount of variation in the tariff rates – minimum, maximum, and average ap-
plied MFN tariffs (ad valorem equivalent) – that is explained by our main fixed
effects (NAICS5 by country pair and country by NAICS2 x year) ranges between
67% - 91%. This suggests that a lot of the variation in tariffs is controlled for with
the fixed effects we employ throughout. Moreover, all our international trade re-
sults are robust to making the time fixed effect specific at the three digit NAICS
sector level, by destination country by year. In this case, the variation explained
with these fixed effects ranges between 79%-94%, highlighting that we effectively
control for time varying tariff barriers, but are still able to estimate the effect on
energy intensive exports precisely.
A more direct test is to see whether export tariff changes at the five digit
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NAICS sector by destination country are correlated with the energy intensity of
a five digit sector in a way that is correlated with the emergence of the natural
gas price gap. The results are presented in Table A13. There is no apparent or
consistent pattern in the data suggesting that tariffs changed systematically in a
way that is correlated with the energy intensity of a sector and the price gap.
Finally, we have re-estimated our main results controlling for country and
industry specific export tariffs. As expected given our aforementioned exercises,
the results are fully robust and available from the authors upon request.
C Theory and Simulation
In this appendix we first show how our theoretical framework is solved, present
the set of equations that need to hold in equilibrium, and then conduct a series of
quantitative exercises.
C.1 Model Solution
C.1.1 Optimal Behavior and Market Clearing
The industry level first order condition of the cost minimization problem equates
the marginal rate of technical substitution between the two inputs with the input
price ratio:
βi
1− βi
Lki
Nki
=
wkN
wkL
. (9)
Here, Nki and L
k
i denote the respective energy and labour input allocations. More-
over, the solution to the firm level price setting problem is the usual CES con-
stant mark-up rule for both the domestic and export market, pix = τi pid(ϕ) =
τi(w
k
N)
βi(wkL)
1−βi /ρϕ, where subscript d indicates domestic variables, while sub-
script x denotes exporting related prices.
Profits from domestic activity, πkid, and from exporting, π
k
id, can be written as
πkim(ϕ) =
rim(ϕ)
σ
− fim(w
k
N)
βi(wkL)
1−βi , m ∈ {d, x},
where ri(ϕ) = rid(ϕ) + rix(ϕ) are revenues of a firm with productivity ϕ, the
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sum of domestic sales and sales abroad (which are zero for non-exporters). The
existence of fixed costs of producing together with free entry implies that there is
a unique zero profit cutoff ϕ∗ki in every country and industry implicitly defined
by
ri(ϕ
∗k
i ) = fid(w
k
N)
βi(wkL)
1−βi , (10)
so that all firms that draw ϕ < ϕ∗ki exit the market and all firms with ϕ > ϕ
∗k
i
survive. Similarly, fixed costs of exporting imply that only the most productive
firms among the survivors will export, i.e. every firm with productivity ϕ > ϕ∗kix .
This selection mechanism is our key intra-industry concern as described above.
Firms, when making the decision to enter the market or not, compare their
expected discounted profit from entering with entry costs. Since we assume an
infinite number of potential entrants, it must be that, in equilibrium, the expected
discounted profit (which is conditional on survival, i.e. a productivity draw above
ϕ∗ki ) is equal to the sunk cost of entry. We follow the model of Melitz (2003) and
posit that firms are infinitely lived once they have successfully entered, but face an
exogenous probability of exit δ that they use to discount. Using the relationships
rkid(ϕ) = (
ϕ
ϕ∗ki
)σ−1rkid(ϕ
∗k
i ) and r
k
ix(ϕ) = (
ϕ
ϕ∗kix
)σ−1rkix(ϕ
∗k
ix ) together with (10), we can
write the free entry condition as
fid
δ
∫ ∞
ϕ∗ki


(
ϕ
ϕ∗ki
)σ−1
− 1

 (−γϕ−γ−1)dϕ+
fix
δ
∫ ∞
ϕ∗kix


(
ϕ
ϕ∗kix
)σ−1
− 1

 (−γϕ−γ−1)dϕ = fei (11)
Moreover, given zero expected profits in all markets ex ante, total revenues will
be paid out to factors in full35 and so total country revenues (which are equal to
total expenditure) in equilibrium are
Rk = wkN(N
k
i + N
k
j ) + w
k
L(L
k
i + L
k
j ). (12)
35To see this result more clearly, note that variable, fixed, entry, and potentially fixed exporting
costs are all paid in terms of the same composite Cobb-Douglas input bundle.
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Finally, in equilibrium we require both factor markets and goods markets to
clear:
Nk1 + N
k
2 = N¯
k
Lk1 + L
k
2 = L¯
k
(13)
and
Rki = αiR
k Mki
(
pkid(ϕ˜
k
i )
Pki
)1−σ
+ αiR
lχki M
k
i
(
τi p
k
id(ϕ˜
k
ix)
Pli
)1−σ
. (14)
ϕ˜kz with z ∈ {i, ix} are the average productivities of active firms and exporters,
respectively, defined as
(ϕ˜kz)
σ−1 = (ϕ∗ki )
γ
∫ ∞
ϕ∗ki
ϕσ−1(γϕ−γ−1)dϕ.
Rki are aggregate revenues in industry i, M
k
i = R
k
i /ri(ϕ˜
k
i ) is the number of active
firms in industry i and χki is the ex ante probability of exporting conditional on
survival, which, by the law of large numbers, equals the share of exporters when
there is a continuum of firms:
χki =
(
ϕ∗kix
ϕ∗ki
)−γ
.
An equilibrium is a collection of quantities {Rk, Nki , L
k
i }, cut-offs {ϕ
∗k
i }, and
prices {Pki , w
k
N, w
k
L}, that satisfies equations (9), (12), (11), (13), (14), and the price
index definitions for both countries and industries. Altogether there are 22 vari-
ables in 22 equations and we choose energy in l as our nume´raire, wlN = 1. The
full set of equations after all substitutions is reported below. Bernard et al. (2007)
prove that there is a unique solution to this system of equations and we will not
reiterate it in this paper.
C.1.2 Collection of general equilibrium conditions with a Pareto parametriza-
tion
The equilibrium satisfies
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Nk1 + N
k
2 = N¯
k
Lk1 + L
k
2 = L¯
k
(15)
(Labor market clearing conditions)
βi
1− βi
Lki
Nki
=
wkN
wkL
(16)
(cost minimization)
Rk = wkN(N
k
i + N
k
j ) + w
k
L(L
k
i + L
k
j ) (17)
(Aggregate Revenues)
fid(σ− 1)
δ(γ+ 1− σ)
(ϕ∗ki )
−γ

1 + τ−γi
(
Pki
Pli
)−γ(
Rk
Rl
) −γ
σ−1 (
fix
fid
)−γ+σ−1
σ−1

 = fei (18)
(free entry conditions)
(Pki )
1−σ =
ρσ−1
σ fid
Rki (ϕ
∗k
i )
σ−1
[
(wkN)
βi(wkL)
1−βi
]σ [
1 + τ−γi
(
fix
fid
)−γ+σ−1
σ−1
(
Pki
Pli
)−γ (
Rk
Rl
) −γ
σ−1
]+
ρσ−1
σ fid
Rli(ϕ
∗l
i )
σ−1 τ
−γ
i
(
fix
fid
)−γ+σ−1
σ−1
(
Pli
Pki
)−γ+σ−1 (
Rl
Rk
)−γ+σ−1
σ−1
[
(wlN)
βi(wlL)
1−βi
]σ [
1 + τ−γi
(
fix
fid
)−γ+σ−1
σ−1
(
Pli
Pki
)−γ (
Rl
Rk
) −γ
σ−1
] (19)
(utility maximization)
[(wkN)
βi(wkL)
1−βi ]σ =
αiρ
σ−1
σ fid
Rk(Pki )
σ−1(ϕ∗ki )
σ−1 (20)
(goods market clearing)
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C.2 Derivations and Proofs
We start with a few definitions. First
xˆ ≡
xk
xl
is our notation for a ratio of a variable across countries. Using this notation,
wˆi ≡ wˆ
βi
N wˆ
1−βi
L i ∈ {1, 2}.
Finally, let τ
−γ
i ( fix/ fid)
−γ+σ−1
σ−1 ≡ ci.
In a first step, we prove a useful lemma:
Lemma 1 (
Rk
Rl
) −γ
σ−1
(
Pki
Pli
)−γ
=
wˆ
−σγ
σ−1
i − ci
1− ciwˆ
−σγ
σ−1
i
Proof. Taking the ratio of goods market clearing conditions across countries yields
wˆσi =
(
Rk
Rl
)(
Pki
Pli
)σ−1
(ϕˆi
∗)σ−1
or
(
Pki
Pli
)−γ(
Rk
Rl
) −γ
σ−1
= wˆ
−σγ
σ−1 (ϕˆi
∗)γ (21)
Moreover, taking the same ratio of the free entry conditions and substituting (21)
leads to
(ϕˆ∗i )
−γ 1 + ciwˆ
−σγ
σ−1 (ϕˆi
∗)γ
1 + ciwˆ
σγ
σ−1 (ϕˆi
∗)−γ
= 1, (22)
so that
(ϕˆ∗i )
γ =
1− ciwˆ
σγ
σ−1
i
1− ciwˆ
−σγ
σ−1
i
. (23)
We combine (21) and (23) to obtain Lemma 1.
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Now we are in a position to show that there is a one-to-one relationship be-
tween relative factor prices (marginal costs) across countries and relative aggre-
gate industry productivities. Moreover, aggregate productivities move in tandem
with relative marginal costs in the sense that the effect a shock to relative marginal
costs will be amplified by an aggregate productivity response.
Proof. Taking the ratio of the free entry conditions across countries, respecting the
relationship between the zero profit cut-offs and average industry productivity,
and applying Lemma 1 we arrive at
(
ˆ˜ϕ
)γ
=
1 + ki
1 + li
where
ki ≡ ci
wˆ
−σγ
σ−1
i − ci
1− ciwˆ
−σγ
σ−1
i
and
li ≡ ci
wˆ
σγ
σ−1
i − ci
1− ciwˆ
σγ
σ−1
i
.
In the same way we can express relative industry productivity across industries
within a country:
(
ϕ˜i
ϕ˜j
)γ
=
1 + ki
1 + k j
.
All ki and li, i ∈ {1, 2} are all strictly monotonic in wˆi, i ∈ {1, 2}. Moreover, if
there is a decrease in the relative across country energy price then energy intensive
industries become relatively more productive.
The derivation of gross output Rki works as follows. We use the goods market
clearing condition to substitute wages out of the expressions for the ideal price
indices to arrive at
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αiR
k = Rki
1
1 + ki
+ Rli
li
1 + li
. (24)
The equivalence (24) holds for the foreign country, too, and gives us a system
of two equations in the two variables of interest, Rki and R
l
i . Solving this system
and rearranging yields
Rki = αiR
k
1− li
Rl
Rk
1− ciwˆ
−σγ
σ−1
i
. (25)
It is easy to see that – holding total incomes constant – gross output is de-
creasing in the price gap wˆN and more so for the energy intensive sector, proving
prediction 1.
Aggregate exports in sector i are
Xki = αiR
lχki M
k
i
(
τi p
k
id(ϕ˜
k
ix)
Pli
)1−σ
.
Again using Lemma 1, we can write exports as
Xki =
ki
1 + ki
Rki , (26)
which is also decreasing in wˆN and more so for the energy intensive sector, prov-
ing prediction 3.
C.3 Quantitative Analysis
In this section we outline a calibration/simulation exercise for our simple model
to illustrate the key comparative statics. We also provide details on how we derive
our quantitative predictions for the first and third comparative statics exercises in
the main text.
In the simulations, we use the following parameter values:
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Parameter Value Origin
σ 3.8 BRS
γ 3.4 BRS
β1, β2 0.1091, 0.0073 Own
α1, α2 0.53, 0.47 Own
L¯k 15000 Own
N¯l, L¯l 10000, 15000 Own
fe1, fe2 1, 1 Own
f1, f2 0.1, 0.1 Own
f1x, f2x 1.5* f1, 1.5* f2 Own
δ 0.025 BRS
τ1, τ2 1.4, 1.4 Own
We take Bernard et al. (2007) as guidance and adjust their choices slightly
to facilitate finding a numerical solution. Both factor intensities and expenditure
shares – key scale parameters as is evident from the analytical solutions in (1) and
(3) – however, are calibrated using our data: First, we compute the (sector size
weighted) average energy intensity of industries with energy cost shares weakly
larger than the median industry (see table 1 for the exact numbers). We conduct
the same calculation for weakly below median industries to find the energy in-
tensity of the composite factor intensive industry in the model. The sum of the
relative sector sizes across the two groups (normalized to manufacturing output
only) gives us the expenditure shares αi.
The main results are shown in figure A5, where we linearly increase the rela-
tive domestic endowment with energy from 0.5 to 1.5. The first graph plots the
model implied development of the energy price gap, defined in such a way that
a fall in k’s price is captured by an increase in the price gap. The third graph
illustrates how output grows in the energy intensive industry relative to the com-
posite input intensive one and, as evidenced by the second graph in the first row,
the productivity effect goes in the same direction as the neo-classical Rybczyn-
ski effect, amplifying the response rather than dampening, let alone reversing it.
Prediction 2 is illustrated in the second row of figure A5, while the third row
shows the behavior of exports and imports, illustrating our third prediction. As
discussed in the main text, our result for the extensive industry margin of export-
ing is not directly derived from the literal model we outline in this paper and
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therefore we do not show any quantitative results for the fourth prediction.
Finally, we examine the size of the output and export response implied by
our model. According to expression (1), we need additional data on U.S. and
OECD Europe output and producer prices (to proxy for the composite input’s
price) for 2006, which we obtain from the BEA, Eurostat36, and the OECD for
manufacturing industries. We plug these into (1) together with our parameter
values and natural gas price information (indexed to 2010 to match PPI) for 2006.
In order to obtain the change in percent, we hold total manufacturing output R
as well as the price of the composite good – the PPI – fixed for both countries
at the 2006 level and let the natural gas prices evolve as observed for 2007 in the
data, giving us the response to a USD 1 increase in the price gap. We repeat the
procedure for exports.
D Exploiting Within-U.S. Natural Gas Prices
As highlighted in Fetzer (2014), the shale gas boom has lead to some price dis-
crepancies within the U.S., which are partly due to a lack of physical pipeline
capacity, but also due to high transport costs within pipelines over long distances.
These transport costs are, however, very small in comparison to the transport costs
when considering shipping natural gas as LNG. Nevertheless, we explore here
whether within-U.S. price differences provide dramatically different estimates as
compared with the main results in the paper.
We perform the main analysis pertaining to domestic outcomes (employment
and capital investment) and trade outcomes, accounting for the spatial price dif-
ferences within the U.S.. We have to make some strong assumptions with regards
to the trade data: we match U.S. customs districts to U.S. states to be able to
exploit natural gas price data available at the state level. This means, we implic-
itly assume that the customs district, where an export transaction is recorded,
is sufficiently close to the location of production. The industrial use natural gas
price data was obtained from the Energy Information Administration (EIA) and
is available at the state level from 1997 onwards.
36We use information that aggregates 28 member countries of the EU, because PPI data are read-
ily available at that level. Disaggregated price data at the country level are difficult to aggregate
and so we choose the lesser evil of extending our scope to non-OECD EU members.
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The empirical analysis is simply adding a further dimension. For the factor
allocation exercise, we estimate:
yjkt = αjk + dj′kt + ljqt + γ× Ej × ∆Pkt + ǫjkt (27)
The only aspect added is a further index k indicating the county within a state
where employment and capital investment occur. The price gap is now measured
as the difference between the state level prices and the OECD Europe average. For
the capital investment, rather than exploiting levels of investment in a county, we
construct a dummy that is equal to 1 in case there was any investment announced
in a year-sector-county; for employment, we use the log of Employment +1 in a
given sector-year-county.
For the trade exercise, we estimate
ydjkt = αdjk + ljqt + bdj′t + γ× Ej × ∆Pkt + ǫdjkt (28)
Again, the only difference is that we added the sub-index k accounting for the
state. The results for domestic factor allocation are presented in Table A10. The
results for trade outcomes are presented in Table A11. Throughout, the results
are very similar as in the main analysis.
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Figures and Tables for Appendix
Table A2: Effect of natural gas price gap on energy intensive gross manufacturing
output, employment and capital expenditure between 2000 and 2013.
All Energy Inputs Natural Gas Input
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Direct Direct + Indirect Direct Direct + Indirect
Panel A: Gross Output
Energy Intensity 0.148*** 0.167*** 0.155*** 0.172***
× Price Gap (0.038) (0.034) (0.041) (0.040)
Sectors 150 150 150 150
Observations 2100 2100 2100 2100
R-squared .965 .966 .965 .966
Panel B: Employment
Energy Intensity 0.036* 0.050** 0.037** 0.050***
× Price Gap (0.020) (0.020) (0.017) (0.019)
Sectors 171 171 171 171
Observations 2386 2386 2386 2386
R-squared .971 .971 .971 .971
Panel C: Investment NBER-CES
Energy Intensity 0.144** 0.185*** 0.142** 0.181***
× Price Gap (0.066) (0.066) (0.057) (0.063)
Sectors 153 153 153 153
Observations 1836 1836 1836 1836
R-squared .934 .935 .934 .935
Panel D: Capital Expenditures
Energy Intensity 0.354 0.387 0.297 0.371
× Price Gap (0.284) (0.275) (0.254) (0.283)
Sectors 171 171 171 171
Observations 1881 1881 1881 1881
R-squared .642 .643 .642 .643
All specifications include
5 Digit Industry FE X X X X
2 Digit Industry x Year FE X X X X
Oil and Gas Linkage x Year FE X X X X
Notes: Price Gap is measured as the difference between an OECD average natural gas price and the
US industrial use natural gas price. The dependent variable in Panel A is the log of gross output
in a given sector. The dependent variable in Panel B is the log(employment) by five digit sector
aggregated across counties not located above or near shale deposits. The dependent variable in Panel
C is a log(investment) obtained from the NBER-CES data, while Panel D uses the Conway capital
expenditure data transformed in log(expenditures), again aggregated excluding counties located
above or near shale deposits. The Energy Intensity measure used in columns (1) and (2) focus on
all types of energy consumed, while the measure used in columns (3) and (4) focus on natural gas
consumption. Columns (1) and (3) use only direct energy consumption, while columns (2) and (4)
also includes indirect energy input through intermediate goods. Standard errors are clustered at the
four digit sector level with stars indicating *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table A3: Effect of natural gas price gap on energy intensive export, import values on the
extensive and intensive margin between 1997 and 2012.
All Energy Inputs Natural Gas Input
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Direct Direct + Indirect Direct Direct + Indirect
Panel A: Overall Export Value
Energy Intensity 0.205*** 0.189*** 0.197*** 0.185***
× Price Gap (0.033) (0.027) (0.034) (0.028)
Clusters 82 82 82 82
Observations 164789 164789 164789 164789
R-squared .906 .907 .906 .907
Panel B: Overall Import Value
Energy Intensity -0.024 -0.008 -0.003 0.012
× Price Gap (0.038) (0.033) (0.037) (0.033)
Clusters 82 82 82 82
Observations 123076 123076 123076 123076
R-squared .908 .908 .908 .908
Panel C: Any Export
Energy Intensity -0.001 0.002 -0.004 -0.000
× Price Gap (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Clusters 82 82 82 82
Observations 215196 215196 215196 215196
R-squared .716 .716 .716 .716
Panel D: Any Import
Energy Intensity -0.007** -0.005** -0.004 -0.003
× Price Gap (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Clusters 82 82 82 82
Observations 215196 215196 215196 215196
R-squared .759 .759 .759 .759
All specifications include
Country x 5 Digit Industry FE X X X X
Country x 2 Digit Industry x Year FE X X X X
Oil and Gas Linkage x Year FE X X X X
Notes: Price Gap is measured as the difference between a world region average industrial use natural
gas price and the US industrial use natural gas price. The dependent variable in Panel A and B are the
logged values of exports and imports respectively. The dependent variable in Panel C and Panel D is a
dummy that takes the value of 1 in case of non-zero exports (imports) in a sector and year respectively.
The Energy Intensity measures used throughout are at the five digit sector level and come from the U.S. IO
table. Columns (1) and (2) focus on all types of energy consumed, while the measure used in columns (3)
and (4) focus on natural gas consumption. Columns (1) and (3) use only direct energy consumption, while
columns (2) and (4) also includes indirect energy input through intermediate goods. Standard errors are
clustered at the destination country level with stars indicating *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table A4: Effect of natural gas price gap on energy intensive export, import values on the
extensive and intensive margin between 1997 and 2012.
All Energy Inputs Natural Gas Input
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Direct Direct + Indirect Direct Direct + Indirect
Panel A: Overall Export Value
Energy Intensity 0.206*** 0.190*** 0.191*** 0.179***
× Price Gap (0.038) (0.033) (0.042) (0.037)
Clusters 27 27 27 27
Observations 53230 53230 53230 53230
R-squared .931 .931 .931 .931
Panel B: Overall Import Value
Energy Intensity -0.020 -0.022 0.025 0.014
× Price Gap (0.042) (0.041) (0.041) (0.038)
Clusters 27 27 27 27
Observations 51064 51064 51064 51064
R-squared .919 .919 .919 .919
Panel C: Any Export
Energy Intensity 0.006** 0.005** 0.005** 0.004**
× Price Gap (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Clusters 27 27 27 27
Observations 55932 55932 55932 55932
R-squared .613 .612 .612 .612
Panel D: Any Import
Energy Intensity -0.001 0.003 -0.001 0.003
× Price Gap (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Clusters 27 27 27 27
Observations 55932 55932 55932 55932
R-squared .672 .672 .672 .672
All specifications include
Country x 5 Digit Industry FE X X X X
Country x 2 Digit Industry x Year FE X X X X
Oil and Gas Linkage x Year FE X X X X
Notes: Price Gap is measured as the difference between a country average industrial use natural gas price
and the US industrial use natural gas price. The dependent variable in Panel A and B are the logged values
of exports and imports respectively. The dependent variable in Panel C and Panel D is a dummy that takes
the value of 1 in case of non-zero exports (imports) in a sector and year respectively. The Energy Intensity
measures used throughout are at the five digit sector level and come from the U.S. IO table. Columns (1)
and (2) focus on all types of energy consumed, while the measure used in columns (3) and (4) focus on
natural gas consumption. Columns (1) and (3) use only direct energy consumption, while columns (2) and
(4) also includes indirect energy input through intermediate goods. Standard errors are clustered at the
destination country level with stars indicating *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table A5: Robustness to removing border countries Canada and Mexico: Effect of natural
gas price gap on energy intensive export, import values on the extensive and intensive
margin between 1997 and 2012.
All Energy Inputs Natural Gas Input
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Direct Direct + Indirect Direct Direct + Indirect
Panel A: Overall Export Value
Energy Intensity 0.205*** 0.192*** 0.210*** 0.199***
× Price Gap (0.022) (0.019) (0.023) (0.019)
Clusters 216 216 216 216
Observations 353563 353563 353563 353563
R-squared .886 .886 .886 .886
Panel B: Overall Import Value
Energy Intensity -0.011 0.019 -0.004 0.023
× Price Gap (0.032) (0.027) (0.031) (0.027)
Clusters 214 214 214 214
Observations 202435 202435 202435 202435
R-squared .899 .899 .899 .899
Panel C: Any Export
Energy Intensity 0.002 0.004** 0.000 0.003
× Price Gap (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Mean of DV .652 .652 .652 .652
Clusters 216 216 216 216
Observations 546048 546048 546048 546048
R-squared .711 .711 .711 .711
Panel D: Any Import
Energy Intensity -0.006** -0.005** -0.004 -0.003
× Price Gap (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Mean of DV .378 .378 .378 .378
Clusters 216 216 216 216
Observations 546048 546048 546048 546048
R-squared .75 .75 .75 .75
All specifications include
Country x 5 Digit Industry FE X X X X
Country x 2 Digit Industry x Year FE X X X X
Oil and Gas Linkage x Year FE X X X X
Notes: Price Gap is measured as the difference between a country average industrial use natural gas price
and the US industrial use natural gas price. The dependent variable in Panel A and B are the logged values
of exports and imports respectively. The dependent variable in Panel C and Panel D is a dummy that takes
the value of 1 in case of non-zero exports (imports) in a sector and year respectively. The Energy Intensity
measures used throughout are at the five digit sector level and come from the U.S. IO table. Columns (1)
and (2) focus on all types of energy consumed, while the measure used in columns (3) and (4) focus on
natural gas consumption. Columns (1) and (3) use only direct energy consumption, while columns (2) and
(4) also includes indirect energy input through intermediate goods. Standard errors are clustered at the
destination country level with stars indicating *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table A6: Estimating the effect of US natural gas endowment proxied by estimated recov-
erable reserves on energy intensive gross manufacturing output, employment and capital
expenditure between 2000 and 2013.
All Energy Inputs Natural Gas Input
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Direct Direct + Indirect Direct Direct + Indirect
Panel A: Gross Output
Energy Intensity x Natural Gas Reserves 1.829*** 2.067*** 1.911*** 2.122***
(0.467) (0.421) (0.492) (0.490)
Sectors 150 150 150 150
Observations 1950 1950 1950 1950
R-squared .966 .967 .966 .967
Panel B: Employment
Energy Intensity x Natural Gas Reserves 0.493** 0.642*** 0.498** 0.642***
(0.245) (0.242) (0.208) (0.232)
Sectors 171 171 171 171
Observations 2219 2219 2219 2219
R-squared .973 .973 .973 .973
Panel C: Capital Expenditures
Energy Intensity x Natural Gas Reserves 3.814 4.710 2.417 3.969
(3.907) (3.621) (2.966) (3.403)
Sectors 171 171 171 171
Observations 1710 1710 1710 1710
R-squared .648 .649 .648 .649
All specifications include
5 Digit Industry FE X X X X
2 Digit Industry x Year FE X X X X
Oil and Gas Linkage x Year FE X X X X
Notes: Gas Reserves are estimates of the US dry natural gas reserves provided by the EIA. The dependent
variable in Panel A is the log of gross output in a given sector. The dependent variable in Panel B is the
log(employment) by five digit sector aggregated across counties not located above or near shale deposits. The
dependent variable in Panel C is a log(capital expenditures), again aggregated excluding counties located above
or near shale deposits. The Energy Intensity measure used in columns (1) and (2) focus on all types of energy
consumed, while the measure used in columns (3) and (4) focus on natural gas consumption. Columns (1) and
(3) use only direct energy consumption, while columns (2) and (4) also includes indirect energy input through
intermediate goods. Standard errors are clustered at the four digit sector level with stars indicating *** p < 0.01,
** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table A7: Estimating the effect of US natural gas endowment proxied by estimated recov-
erable reserves on energy intensive export, import values on the extensive and intensive
margin between 1997 and 2012.
All Energy Inputs Natural Gas Input
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Direct Direct + Indirect Direct Direct + Indirect
Panel A: Overall Export Value
Energy Intensity 2.156*** 2.089*** 2.226*** 2.171***
× Natural Gas Reserves (0.234) (0.197) (0.237) (0.202)
Clusters 218 218 218 218
Observations 379635 379635 379635 379635
R-squared .891 .891 .891 .891
Panel B: Overall Import Value
Energy Intensity 0.081 0.294 0.219 0.399
× Natural Gas Reserves (0.342) (0.292) (0.335) (0.289)
Clusters 216 216 216 216
Observations 218961 218961 218961 218961
R-squared .903 .903 .903 .903
Panel C: Any Export
Energy Intensity 0.043** 0.066*** 0.028 0.054***
× Natural Gas Reserves (0.022) (0.019) (0.020) (0.018)
Clusters 218 218 218 218
Observations 585548 585548 585548 585548
R-squared .711 .711 .711 .711
Panel D: Any Import
Energy Intensity -0.065** -0.057*** -0.037 -0.034
× Natural Gas Reserves (0.026) (0.022) (0.026) (0.021)
Clusters 218 218 218 218
Observations 585548 585548 585548 585548
R-squared .751 .751 .751 .751
All specifications include
Country x 5 Digit Industry FE X X X X
Country x 2 Digit Industry x Year FE X X X X
Oil and Gas Linkage x Year FE X X X X
Notes: Gas Reserves are estimates of the US dry natural gas reserves provided by the EIA. The dependent
variable in Panel A and B are the logged values of exports and imports respectively. The dependent variable
in Panel C and Panel D is a dummy that takes the value of 1 in case of non-zero exports (imports) in a sector
and year respectively. The Energy Intensity measures used throughout are at the five digit sector level and
come from the U.S. IO table. Columns (1) and (2) focus on all types of energy consumed, while the measure
used in columns (3) and (4) focus on natural gas consumption. Columns (1) and (3) use only direct energy
consumption, while columns (2) and (4) also includes indirect energy input through intermediate goods.
Standard errors are clustered at the destination country level with stars indicating *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05,
* p < 0.1.
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Table A8: Intensive margin effect of natural gas price gap on energy intensive export and
import values between 1997 and 2012.
All Energy Inputs Natural Gas Input
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Direct Direct + Indirect Direct Direct + Indirect
Panel A: Overall Export Value
Energy Intensity 0.239*** 0.234*** 0.238*** 0.233***
× Price Gap (0.023) (0.019) (0.024) (0.020)
Clusters 192 192 192 192
Observations 267220 267220 267220 267220
R-squared .899 .899 .899 .899
Panel B: Overall Import Value
Energy Intensity -0.009 0.022 -0.004 0.024
× Price Gap (0.034) (0.029) (0.033) (0.028)
Clusters 186 186 186 186
Observations 184715 184715 184715 184715
R-squared .904 .904 .904 .904
All specifications include
Country x 5 Digit Industry FE X X X X
Country x 2 Digit Industry x Year FE X X X X
Oil and Gas Linkage x Year FE X X X X
Notes: Price Gap is measured as the difference between an OECD average natural gas price and the US
industrial use natural gas price. The dependent variable in Panel A and B are the logged values of exports
and imports respectively. The sample is restricted to the set of country-sector pairs with which the U.S. has
had some non-zero trade across all years from 1997-2012. The Energy Intensity measures used throughout
are at the five digit sector level and come from the U.S. IO table. Columns (1) and (2) focus on all types
of energy consumed, while the measure used in columns (3) and (4) focus on natural gas consumption.
Columns (1) and (3) use only direct energy consumption, while columns (2) and (4) also includes indirect
energy input through intermediate goods. Standard errors are clustered at the destination country level
with stars indicating *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table A9: World-IO Table Energy Intensity Measures: Effect of natural gas price gap on energy
intensive export, import values on the extensive and intensive margin between 1997 and 2012.
US WIOT Requirements Trading Country WIOT Requirements
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Direct Direct + Indirect Direct Direct + Indirect
Panel A: Overall Export Value
Energy Intensity 0.123*** 0.107*** 0.134*** 0.111***
× Price Gap (0.029) (0.023) (0.025) (0.019)
Clusters 35 35 35 35
Observations 85399 85399 85399 85399
R-squared .919 .919 .919 .919
Panel B: Overall Import Value
Energy Intensity -0.052 -0.029 -0.068 -0.049
× Price Gap (0.044) (0.033) (0.043) (0.031)
Clusters 35 35 35 35
Observations 77321 77321 77321 77321
R-squared .913 .913 .913 .913
All specifications include
5 Digit Industry FE X X X X
2 Digit Industry x Year FE X X X X
Oil and Gas Linkage x Year FE X X X X
Notes: Price Gap is measured as the difference between a world region average industrial use natural gas price
and the US industrial use natural gas price. The sample is restricted to the set of countries for which IO table
requirement coefficients could be computed from the WIOT. The dependent variable in Panel A and B are the
logged values of exports and imports respectively. The dependent variable in Panel C and Panel D is a dummy
that takes the value of 1 in case of non-zero exports (imports) in a sector and year respectively. The Energy
Intensity measures used throughout varies across 14 three digit sectors. Columns (1) and (2) focus on U.S. WIOT
direct and total energy consumption, while Columns (3) and (4) use the relevant energy intensity measures for the
trading country. Standard errors are clustered at the destination country level with stars indicating *** p < 0.01,
** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table A10: Effect of natural gas price gap between U.S. states and the OECD Europe
on energy intensive gross employment and capital expenditure between 2000 and
2013.
All Energy Inputs Natural Gas Input
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Direct Direct + Indirect Direct Direct + Indirect
Panel A: Employment
Energy Intensity 0.009*** 0.017*** 0.007*** 0.016***
× Price Gap (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Sectors 171 171 171 171
Observations 7093151 7093151 7093151 7093151
R-squared .871 .871 .871 .871
Panel B: Capital Expenditures
Energy Intensity 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001***
× Price Gap (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Sectors 171 171 171 171
Observations 5575549 5575549 5575549 5575549
R-squared .168 .168 .168 .168
All specifications include
County x 5 Digit Industry FE X X X X
2 Digit Industry x Year FE X X X X
Oil and Gas Linkage x Year FE X X X X
Notes: Price gap measures the differnce in the OECD Europe industrial use average price and
U.S. state level industrial use natural gas prices. The dependent variable in Panel A is the
log(employment+1) by five digit sector in counties not located above or near shale deposits. The
dependent variable in Panel B is a dummy that is 1 if there was any capital expenditures in a county
and year, excluding counties located above or near shale deposits. The Energy Intensity measure used
in columns (1) and (2) focus on all types of energy consumed, while the measure used in columns (3)
and (4) focus on natural gas consumption. Columns (1) and (3) use only direct energy consumption,
while columns (2) and (4) also includes indirect energy input through intermediate goods. Standard
errors are clustered at the U.S. state level with stars indicating *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table A11: Effect of natural gas price gap between U.S. states and OECD Europe on energy
intensive export, import values on the extensive and intensive margin between 1997 and
2012.
All Energy Inputs Natural Gas Input
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Direct Direct + Indirect Direct Direct + Indirect
Panel A: Overall Export Value
Energy Intensity 0.133*** 0.123*** 0.136*** 0.129***
× Price Gap (0.031) (0.026) (0.032) (0.027)
Clusters 40 40 40 40
Observations 2299198 2299198 2299198 2299198
R-squared .768 .768 .768 .768
Panel B: Overall Import Value
Energy Intensity 0.028 0.053** 0.025 0.048*
× Price Gap (0.029) (0.024) (0.029) (0.024)
Clusters 40 40 40 40
Observations 1651893 1651893 1651893 1651893
R-squared .803 .803 .803 .803
Panel C: Any Export
Energy Intensity 0.002 0.002 0.002** 0.002*
× Price Gap (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Clusters 40 40 40 40
Observations 2.21e+07 2.21e+07 2.21e+07 2.21e+07
R-squared .677 .677 .677 .677
Panel D: Any Import
Energy Intensity -0.002** -0.001 -0.002** -0.001
× Price Gap (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Clusters 40 40 40 40
Observations 2.21e+07 2.21e+07 2.21e+07 2.21e+07
R-squared .723 .723 .723 .723
All specifications include
State x Country x 5 Digit Industry FE X X X X
Country x 2 Digit Industry x Year FE X X X X
Oil and Gas Linkage x Year FE X X X X
Notes: Price Gap is measured as the difference between the OECD Europe average industrial use gas price
and U.S. state level natural gas prices. The dependent variable in Panel A and B are the logged values of
exports and imports respectively. The dependent variable in Panel C and Panel D is a dummy that takes
the value of 1 in case of non-zero exports (imports) in a sector and year respectively. The Energy Intensity
measures used throughout are at the five digit sector level and come from the U.S. IO table. Columns (1) and
(2) focus on all types of energy consumed, while the measure used in columns (3) and (4) focus on natural
gas consumption. Columns (1) and (3) use only direct energy consumption, while columns (2) and (4) also
includes indirect energy input through intermediate goods. Standard errors are two-way clustered at the U.S.
state and destination country level with stars indicating *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table A12: Effect of natural gas price gap on energy intensive export, import values on
the extensive and intensive margin between 1997 and 2012 (including agriculture, mining
and other service sector trade captured in the trade data.
All Energy Inputs Natural Gas Input
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Direct Direct + Indirect Direct Direct + Indirect
Panel A: Overall Export Value
Energy Intensity 0.242*** 0.223*** 0.245*** 0.230***
× Price Gap (0.022) (0.019) (0.023) (0.019)
Clusters 218 218 218 218
Observations 409571 409571 409571 409571
R-squared .89 .89 .89 .89
Panel B: Overall Import Value
Energy Intensity 0.025 0.047* 0.028 0.049*
× Price Gap (0.032) (0.027) (0.031) (0.027)
Clusters 216 216 216 216
Observations 238442 238442 238442 238442
R-squared .903 .903 .903 .903
Panel C: Any Export
Energy Intensity 0.003 0.005** 0.002 0.004**
× Price Gap (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Clusters 218 218 218 218
Observations 655962 655962 655962 655962
R-squared .722 .722 .722 .722
Panel D: Any Import
Energy Intensity -0.002 -0.002 -0.000 -0.001
× Price Gap (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Clusters 218 218 218 218
Observations 655962 655962 655962 655962
R-squared .755 .755 .755 .755
All specifications include
Country x 5 Digit Industry FE X X X X
Country x 2 Digit Industry x Year FE X X X X
Oil and Gas Linkage x Year FE X X X X
Notes: Price Gap is measured as the difference between a country average industrial use natural gas price
and the US industrial use natural gas price. The dependent variable in Panel A and B are the logged
values of exports and imports respectively. The data include agricultural goods, mining sector and service
sector trade included in the trade data and for which a measure of energy intensity could be constructed.
The dependent variable in Panel C and Panel D is a dummy that takes the value of 1 in case of non-zero
exports (imports) in a sector and year respectively. The Energy Intensity measures used throughout are at
the five digit sector level and come from the U.S. IO table. Columns (1) and (2) focus on all types of energy
consumed, while the measure used in columns (3) and (4) focus on natural gas consumption. Columns
(1) and (3) use only direct energy consumption, while columns (2) and (4) also includes indirect energy
input through intermediate goods. Standard errors are clustered at the destination country level with stars
indicating *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table A13: Effect of natural gas price gap on energy intensive export tariffs.
All Energy Inputs Natural Gas Input
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Direct Direct + Indirect Direct Direct + Indirect
Panel A: Minimum Tariff
Energy Intensity 0.186** 0.126 0.159* 0.118
× Price Gap (0.084) (0.118) (0.085) (0.113)
Clusters 108 108 108 108
Observations 181555 181555 181555 181555
R-squared .676 .676 .676 .676
Panel B: Maximum Tariff
Energy Intensity -0.597 -0.510 -0.649* -0.541
× Price Gap (0.373) (0.336) (0.372) (0.326)
Clusters 108 108 108 108
Observations 181555 181555 181555 181555
R-squared .698 .698 .698 .698
Panel C: Average Tariff
Energy Intensity -0.002 -0.014 -0.048 -0.041
× Price Gap (0.121) (0.137) (0.118) (0.132)
Mean of DV 13.4 13.4 13.4 13.4
Clusters 108 108 108 108
Observations 181555 181555 181555 181555
R-squared .696 .696 .696 .696
All specifications include
Country x 5 Digit Industry FE X X X X
Country x 2 Digit Industry x Year FE X X X X
Notes: Price Gap is measured as the difference between an OECD average natural gas price and the
US industrial use natural gas price. The Energy Intensity measure used in columns (1) and (2) focus
on all types of energy consumed, while the measure used in columns (3) and (4) focus on natural gas
consumption. Columns (1) and (3) use only direct energy consumption, while columns (2) and (4) also
includes indirect energy input through intermediate goods. Standard errors are clustered at the four digit
sector level with stars indicating *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Figure A1: Natural Gas Prices for Industrial use across the OECD Europe and the
U.S. over time.
76
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
0
10
00
0
20
00
0
30
00
0
in
 
bi
llio
n
 
cu
bi
c 
fe
e
t
1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
year
Production Exports Imports Non CA/MX exports
Figure A2: U.S. Natural Gas Production, Imports and Exports.
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Figure A3: Crude Oil Prices for Brent (Europe) and WTI (US) over time.
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Figure A4: Map of US States and major US Shale Plays: For the U.S. domestic
employment and capital expenditure data, we remove data from counties that are
located above or near shale plays, before aggregating the data to national five
digit sector level figures.
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